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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 17, 1927, Chief Justice William Howard Taft penned to his
brother, Horace Taft, that later in the day Justice Willis Van Devanter would
be reading aloud “a very important opinion . . . on the question of the right
of the Senate to investigate matters in the Daugherty case . . . .”1 Three years
earlier, on the morning of March 5, 1924, the Los Angeles Times’s editors
assailed former treasury secretary and presidential aspirant, William Gibbs
McAdoo, and oil magnate, Edward Doheny, for lack of ethics and rampant
influence peddling.2 “To say the least, neither McAdoo nor Donheny was
squeamish about trafficking in prestige[,]” the Los Angeles Times printed
before contrasting the two men with another prominent citizen.3 “There is
still living, however, at least one noted American who holds that prestige
acquired through holding a high political position is not something to barter
and exchange.”4 The person the Los Angeles Times’s editors referred to was
Taft, who, after leaving the presidency in 1913, became a professor at Yale’s
1. Letter from William Howard Taft [hereinafter WHT], C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to Horace
Taft, William Taft’s brother [hereinafter HT] (Jan. 17, 1927) (on file with the Library of Congress).
2. Trafficking in Prestige, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1924, at 24 [hereinafter Trafficking in Prestige].
On McAdoo, who was also President Woodrow Wilson’s son-in-law, see James C. Prude, William Gibbs
McAdoo and the Democratic National Convention of 1924, 38 J. S. HIST. 621, 621–28 (1972). On Doheny,
see DAN LA BOTZ, EDWARD L. DOHENY: PETROLEUM, POWER, AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND MEXICO 2–13 (1991). On the relationship of the two men, see JONATHAN DANIELS,
THE TIME BETWEEN THE WARS: ARMISTICE TO PEARL HARBOR 116 (1966).
3. Trafficking in Prestige, supra note 2.
4. Id.
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law school and an advocate for achieving world peace through international
law before ascending to the Court.5 There is a connection between the
editorial and Taft’s letter to his brother in that both involved Doheny. Taft’s
letter originated in an executive branch scandal involving the collective
greed of at least one cabinet officer and powerful men in oil and finance,
including Doheny, who threatened to undermine national security. But
Taft’s participation in the “Daugherty case,”6 an appeal involving the brother
of a former attorney general, was problematic to the principles of judicial
ethics, even if neither the public nor the legal academy questioned it.
The “Teapot Dome” scandal first came to the public’s attention as a
minor news story, albeit one in which the public was unlikely aware of the
scandal itself. On June 2, 1921, the New York Times informed its readers on
its twelfth page that Secretary of the Navy, Edwin Denby, transferred
control over the Navy’s petroleum reserves to the Secretary of the Interior,
Albert Fall.7 Other newspapers also reported the story in the middle of
their dailies. These publications do not appear to report opposition to the
shift of control from the Navy to the Interior Department.8 Perhaps this
was because, as one author posited, President Warren G. Harding had only
recently assumed office and enjoyed the longest post-election “honeymoon”
5. See id.; see also John Paul Frank, Conflict of Interest and Supreme Court Justices, 18 AM. J. COMPAR.
L. 744, 749 (1970) (demonstrating Justice Douglas’s efforts at achieving peace through international
law and arbitration); JOSEPH FRAZIER WALL, ANDREW CARNEGIE 978 (1970) (“As early as May 1909
Taft indicated that he favored the arbitration of all disputes except those that involved an ‘attack upon
a country’s honor or independence.’”); LEWIS O. GOULD, CHIEF EXECUTIVE TO CHIEF JUSTICE:
TAFT BETWIXT THE WHITE HOUSE AND SUPREME COURT 41 (2014). See generally Hamilton Holt, The
League to Enforce Peace, 7 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. CITY N.Y. 257, 259–60 (1917) (pointing out a
contemporary view of peace attempts); see also Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Shall the United States Join a
League to Enforce Peace, 79 ADVOC. PEACE 54, 54 (1917) (suggesting the benefits of joining a League to
Enforce Peace in order to properly balance power).
6. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
7. See Burl Noggle, The Origins of the Teapot Dome Investigation, 44 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 237,
245–46 (1957) (referencing the newspaper’s lack of emphasis on the article); see also Historical
Recognition, LSU FOUNDATION (Sep. 4, 2021, 1:03 PM), https://www.lsufoundation.org/s/1585
/17/interior.aspx?sid=1585&gid=1&pgid=1469
[https://perma.cc/PP9Y-6K5L]
(discussing
Professor Burl Noggle becoming a leading historian on the United States in the 1920s).
In his examination on the roots of the scandal, Noggle noted that conservationists led by
Gifford Pinchot, a fellow Republican and former chief of the United States Forrest Service under
President Theodore Roosevelt, were angered at Fall’s desire to transfer federal forest lands to
corporations. Pinchot, according to Noggle, began a public campaign to oppose Fall and brought
Fall’s anti-conservationist plans to the Senate’s attention. See Noggle, supra, at 250–55 (detailing
Pinchot’s plan to bring down Fall).
8. See Fall Takes Over Naval Oil Reserve: President Shifts Lands as First Step in Oil Reorganization,
WASH. POST, June 2, 1921, at 1.
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of any president in history.9 Moreover, as a result of the 1920 elections, the
House of Representatives had 300 Republicans to 132 Democrats and a
Senate comprised of 59 Republicans and 37 Democrats.10 While not all
Republicans backed Harding in all matters, he had a commanding majority
in both houses of the legislative branch.11 Yet, the transfer of the Navy’s
petroleum reserves to the Interior Department for private drilling might
have surprised members of the public interested in national defense given
Denby’s articulated goals for the United States to have the mightiest Navy
in the world.12 The petroleum reserve transfer certainly surprised a number
of legislators in both parties.
In spite of the post-election “honeymoon,” Harding’s administration
quickly became embroiled in two major scandals. Charles Forbes, the
Veterans Bureau Director, was accused of receiving kickbacks for hospital
construction projects and the sale of surplus equipment.13 Although
Harding forced Forbes to resign, he first sent the director to Europe.14
Forbes’ assistant, Charles Cramer, committed suicide before being called to
testify on the scandal.15 The Veteran’s Bureau scandal would shortly be
overshadowed by “Teapot Dome.” Prior to Richard Nixon’s presidency,
the Harding administration was viewed as the most corrupt of
9. See FRANCIS X. BUSCH, ENEMIES OF THE STATE: AN ACCOUNT OF THE TRIALS OF THE
MARY EUGENIA SURRATT CASE, THE TEAPOT DOME CASES, THE ALPHONSE CAPONE CASE, AND
THE ROSENBERG CASE 93 (1954) (demonstrating Harding’s extra-long “honeymoon” period of
presidential popularity due to his stellar cabinet selections); see also JEFF GUINN, THE VAGABONDS:
THE STORY OF HENRY FORD AND THOMAS EDISON’S TEN-YEAR ROAD TRIP 171 (2019)
(“The senators and congressmen of his party appreciated his hands-off approach to legislation. . . .
The press, so critical of Harding before his election, mostly demonstrated respect for him after his
victory.”); Gary M. Pecquet & Clifford F. Thies, Reputation Overrides Record: How Warren G. Harding
Mistakenly Became the “Worst” President of the United States, 21 INDEP. REV. 29, 31 (2016) (pointing out
“[a]t the time of [Harding’s] death in 1923, [he] was beloved by [the public]”).
10. See Robert P. Saldin, World War I and the “System of 1896,” 72 J. POL. 825, 827 (2010)
(demonstrating Republican and Democratic seats from 1894–1928).
11. See Erik Olssen, The Progressive Group in Congress, 42 THE HISTORIAN 244, 251–53 (1980)
(discussing interparty alignments of Republicans and Democrats who considered themselves
“Progressives” and opposed some of Harding’s policies).
12. See Edwin Denby, Our Naval Policy, OUTLOOK, Mar. 23, 1921, at 453.
13. See ROSEMARY STEVENS, A TIME OF SCANDAL: CHARLES R. FORBES, WARREN G.
HARDING, AND THE MAKING OF THE VETERANS BUREAU 109–10 (2016); CHARLES L. MEE, JR.,
THE OHIO GANG: THE WORLD OF WARREN G. HARDING 153–55 (1981).
14. Declares President Harding Ordered Forbes to Resign, S.E. MISSOURIAN, Nov. 7, 1923, at 1.
15. See BUSCH, supra note 9, at 94 (1954) (discussing Forbes’s assistant, Charles Kramer,
committing suicide rather than address allegations that Forbes received “kickbacks’ by contractors to
whom contracts for the construction of veterans’ hospitals had been given”); STEVENS supra note 13,
at 174–75.
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administrations.16 Harding died on August 2, 1923, and therefore did not
live to see the oil scandal traverse through the federal courts.17
This Article is not a legal history of the “Teapot Dome Scandal.” There
are several scholarly books and articles on the subject.18 Rather, it is a study
in the confluence of national security and judicial ethics as centered on
Chief Justice William Howard Taft during the scandal. In 1927, the Court
issued three opinions arising from the scandal: Pan-American Petroleum and
Transport Company v. United States,19 Mammoth Oil v. United States,20 and
McGrain v. Daugherty.21 Taft, to be sure, did not author any of the three
opinions, but he contributed to each of the three, and his participation in all
three opinions raises a question as to whether there are similar judicial ethics
questions in our own time. Most notably, as president, Taft exercised his
authority to issue an executive order creating two of the naval oil reserves
that Fall leased out. Additionally, Harry Daugherty assisted in Taft’s election
to the presidency in 1908 and his attempted reelection four years later, and
Taft thought highly of Daugherty, whose fate rested in one of the three
pending opinions. Taft should have recused himself on either of these
grounds, and a question arises as to why he did not do so.
These points are only two of the ethical questions involved in this study.
Two other ethics questions are presented in this Article: (1) whether Taft
was initially convinced that the scandal was manufactured to discredit
President Harding, and (2) whether the same was done to

16. See Ruth P. Morgan, Nixon, Watergate, and the Study of the Presidency, 26 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
Q. 217, 234 (1996) (suggesting a hypothetical in which Nixon passed away before his indiscretions
were exposed as Harding did); see also Gary M. Maranell, The Evaluation of Presidents: An Extension of the
Schlesinger Polls, 57 J. AM. HIST. 104, 105 (1970) (comparing Harding with other Presidents); Presidential
Historians Survey 2017, C-SPAN, https://www.c-span.org/presidentsurvey2017/?page=overall
[https://perma.cc/7L87-6P4S] (discussing Harding’s rank among previous Presidents).
17. See PHILLIP G. PAYNE, DEAD LAST: THE PUBLIC MEMORY OF WARREN G. HARDING’S
SCANDALOUS LEGACY 1 (2009); Mark Byrnes, The Presidency and Domestic Policy, 11 OAH MAG. HIST.
21, 22 (1997) (“Despite Harding’s failures, Congress did pass a vital piece of legislation during his
administration—the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.”).
18. See DAVID HODGES STRATTON, TEMPEST OVER TEAPOT DOME: THE STORY OF ALBERT
B. FALL 252–56 (1988) (summarizing major points of Teapot Dome incident); see also Gary D. Libecap,
The Political Allocation of Mineral Rights: A Re-Evaluation of Teapot Dome, 44 J. ECON. HIST. 381, 381–82
(1984) (discussing literature’s de-emphasis on the Teapot Dome scandal’s consequences at an
institutional level); Robert A. Waller, Business and the Initiation of the Teapot Dome Investigation, 36 BUS.
HIST. REV. 334, 334 (1962) (demonstrating an economic and business history of the scandal).
19. Pan Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 456 (1927).
20. Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 13 (1927).
21. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
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President Calvin Coolidge.22 In October 1923, Taft insisted on making a
large donation to a memorial for Harding’s legacy and wanted both of his
sons to take a part in the memorial.23 More than three years past from the
beginning of the McGrain appeal arguments to the published opinion, and,
in that time, a national election and a midterm congressional election
occurred, and Taft sought to keep Harding’s legacy and Coolidge’s
reputation free from aspersion.24 Clearly this is not the duty of a Justice,
but one may wonder whether, since that time, a federal court has delayed
issuing a ruling to protect either an important person or a political
institution. And, Taft had engaged in extrajudicial activity while on the
Court, including supporting international peace efforts, such as the
reduction of naval armaments.25 Should this have disqualified him?
This Article is divided into four sections. Section I presents the
government’s oil policy regarding the public and the United States Navy. It
also highlights Taft’s role in national defense while serving as both Secretary
of War and President. Finally, it includes a background and timeline for the
“Teapot Dome” scandal. Section II examines the traverse of the three
government lawsuits against Doheny, Fall, and Mally Daugherty through the
district courts and appellate courts. A basic outline of prior precedent on
congressional authority to compel individuals to testify or produce evidence
is presented in this section as well, for the purpose of gauging Taft’s
influence in the Daugherty case.26 Included in this section, is an analysis of
Taft’s relationships with the district court judges, in particular, Andrew
McConnell January Cochran of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky who issued a ruling favorable to Daugherty.
Section III presents Taft’s activities and opinions on the scandals from the
time of their discovery through the Court’s issuance of the three opinions.
In his personal correspondences, Taft cast aspersions on numerous senators
investigating the scandal and expressed his views on Daugherty and Fall.
The section also analyzes the three opinions regarding prior caselaw and the
22. See J. Leonard Bates, The Teapot Dome Scandal and the Election of 1924, 60 AM. HIST. REV. 303,
310 (1955) (“Like Chief Justice Taft and many other Republicans, he even suspected a Democratic plot
to discredit his administration.”).
23. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to Robert Taft, WHT’s eldest son [hereinafter
RT] (Dec. 2, 1923) (on file with the Library of Congress).
24. Daugherty, 273 U.S. at 135.
25. Ballantine, supra note 5, at 54 (stating Taft was a leading member of the League to Enforce
Peace and describing difficulties, such as the peace plan providing “no adequate guaranty of peace and
will not make possible any real reduction of armaments”).
26. Daugherty, 273 U.S. at 135.
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lower courts’ decisions. Taft voted with the other Justices to uphold the
Senate’s authority to compel a person to testify and to uphold the voiding
of leases obtained by fraud, but having done so does not mean he influenced
the timing or nature of the opinions.
Before proceeding, there are four points important to this study. First,
Taft is one of the most instrumental federal jurists in shaping modern
judicial ethics rules.27 Taft crafted an important part of the nation’s naval
oil policies, and he also had relationships with some of the key individuals
involved in the legal fights over the scandal. As the current Court and the
lower judiciaries have grappled with, and continue to review, suits from
former President Donald Trump’s conduct and business holdings (as well
as the likelihood that suits involving future presidents will arise), the legal
profession and the judiciary alike may well wonder whether the timing of
the release and content of the rulings and opinions have been treated in a
more careful manner than Taft employed.
Second, this Article utilizes primary source material from several
collections, particularly Taft and his sons, Robert and Charles Taft, which
are located at the Library of Congress. This Article also presents some of
the major reporting on the scandal as it unfolded. Whether or not the
reporting was objective or accurate, the interested public would have partly
gauged the judicial branch’s decisions based on publicly available
information. As noted later, one of the district court judges decried
“sensational features [of reporting] surrounding the transactions involved”
before issuing a ruling against the government.28 Although the press may
present a flawed presentation of the evidence in trials, an impartial and fair
judiciary, and the appearance of an impartial and fair judiciary, are important
to the public’s confidence in judicial integrity.29 Third, Taft was a judicial
27. See Robert Post, The Incomparable Chief Justiceship of William Howard Taft, 2020 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1, 107–08 (2020) (emphasizing Taft’s commitment to judicial reform); Robert B. McKay,
The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 15 (1970); Joshua Kastenberg, Chief
Justice William Howard Taft’s Conception of Judicial Integrity: The Legal History of Tumey v. Ohio, 65 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 317, 340–41 (2017). Dean McKay noted, however, that Taft, while serving as Chief Justice,
undertook activities that would, by 1970, appear to violate norms of judicial conduct. McKay, supra,
at 13.
28. See United States v. Mammoth Oil Co., 5 F.2d 330, 354 (D. Wyo. 1925), (pointing out the
court’s acknowledgement of the public’s possible disdain with the court’s decision), rev’d, 14 F.2d 705
(8th Cir. 1926), aff’d, 275 U.S. 13 (1927).
29. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (asserting the Due Process Clause clearly
requires a “fair trial in a fair tribunal” (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955))); see also Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821–22 (1986) (demonstrating a case involving a judge with no
actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case).
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conservative, who viewed the Court as protecting a status quo based, in part,
on prejudicial beliefs and fear of the electorate embracing socialism.30 For
instance, Taft and former Attorney General George Wickersham lobbied
the Coolidge presidency to not appoint Jews to the federal bench, fearing
the judiciary would follow Justice Louis Brandeis’ jurisprudence, at the very
time that Wickersham presented the government’s argument in the Daugherty
case to the Court.31
Finally, graft and corruption involving vast sums of monies or higher
ranks were not new to either the war or naval departments. In 1876, the
House of Representatives impeached Secretary of War William Belknap
after discovering he received payoffs in exchange for trading stores at
military posts.32 The Belknap impeachment trial in the Senate became
important to the question of whether the Senate maintained jurisdiction
over President Trump after he left office. In 1885, the Court in Wales v.
Whitney33 denied a habeas writ to the Navy’s surgeon general,
Commodore Philip Wales, who faced a court-martial for failing to safeguard
naval funds and medical instruments after subordinates engaged in
fraudulent contracting and pilfered thousands of dollars in equipment.34 In

30. See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, CHIEF JUSTICE 163–64 (1964)
(detailing Taft’s views on the need for a conservative Court and the combatting of socialists and
bolshevist); WHT Statement (Feb. 26, 1911) (on file with the Library of Congress) (asserting “the
march of socialism will find no obstacle in its pathway more serious than a piece of paper once called
a Constitution”).
31. See Letter from George Wickersham, U. S. Att’y Gen. [hereinafter George Wickersham], to
WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct. (Dec. 4, 1924) (on file with the Library of Congress). In this letter,
former Attorney General Wickersham wrote to an agreeing Taft:
All of the Jews in Jewry are now in full cry after the place and I am terribly afraid from what I
hear that Stone has weakened to the extent of feeling that he must select a Hebrew, not realizing
that every time he gives in to them, he makes a lot more trouble for himself, because they are
boldened by the surrender.
Id.; see also Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to George Wickersham (Dec. 3, 1924)
(on file with the Library of Congress) (discussing Taft’s response); Alan Rappeport, That Judge Attacked
by Donald Trump? He’s Faced a Lot Worse, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/06/04/us/politics/donald-trump-university-judge-gonzalo-curiel.html [https://perma.cc/KH
V3-T8PM] (discussing how Taft and Wickersham prestaged Donald Trump’s belief that judges
determine cases in concert with their ethnicity or faith).
32. See, e.g., WILLIAM S. MCFEELY, GRANT: A BIOGRAPHY 428–30 (1982) (discussing Belknap’s
accusation of selling government arms to the French during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871).
33. Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885).
34. See The Case of Surgeon Wales: A Writ of Habeas Corpus Refused—The Court-Martial Meets, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 1885, at 2 (demonstrating a news outlet reporting on the Court’s refusal to issue
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1899, Secretary of War Russell Alger was accused of permitting corruption
in War Department contracting, which led to the sickness and deaths of
thousands of soldiers during the Spanish-American War in the so-called
“Embalmed Beef Scandal.”35 In a court-martial related to that scandal, the
Army prosecuted its commissary general, General Charles Patrick Eagan.36
In 1910, the Court issued United States v. Carter,37 which involved a longlasting investigation into allegations that an Army captain had taken
kickbacks during harbor reconstruction projects in Savannah, Georgia.38
Partly in response to this corruption, Denby’s predecessor as Naval
Secretary, Josephus Daniels, undertook significant efforts to end waste and
corruption in the Navy.39
II. TAFT, HARDING, THE BATTLESHIP, AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE SCANDAL
On April 29, 1922, a little more than five years before Taft’s letter to his
brother, the New York Times’ front page headline read, “Naval Oil Leases by
Secretary Fall to be Investigated” and noted that Secretary of the Interior
Fall permitted private corporations to drill naval oil.40 The Chicago Tribune
headlined its front page, “Senate is Told Interior ‘Reeks in Graft.’”41
Readers of the Los Angeles Times were greeted with the title, “Naval Leases
Under Attack.”42 The Washington Post informed its front page readers that
the Senate would soon investigate the transfer of the Navy’s petroleum
reserves from the Department of the Navy to the Department of the
Surgeon Wales a writ of habeas corpus); Surgeon Wales’s Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1885, at 2
(reporting on the outcome of Wales v. Whitney).
35. See Edward F. Keuchel, Chemicals and Meat: The Embalmed Beef Scandal of the Spanish-American
War, 48 BULL. HIST. MED. 249, 251 (1974) (providing further detail on the scandal); see also Mr. Alger’s
Defense: The Leader in the London Times to Which the ex-Secretary of War Replied, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1899,
at 10 (reporting Alger’s resignation as Secretary of War).
36. See JAMES R. ARNOLD, HEALTH UNDER FIRE: MEDICAL CARE DURING AMERICA’S WARS
115 (2014).
37. United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1910).
38. Id. at 298. See generally PHILLIP LEON, FIRST IN HIS CLASS: CAPTAIN OBERLIN CARTER
AND THE SAVANNAH HARBOR SCANDAL (2013) (providing a full history of the Carter case).
39. See Melvin I. Urofsky, Josephus Daniels and the Armor Trust, 45 N.C. HIST. REV. 237, 240–42
(1968) (highlighting Daniel’s efforts to eliminate wasteful practices in the Navy).
40. See Naval Oil Leases by Secretary Fall to be Investigated, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1922, at 1.
41. Senate is Told Interior Bureau “Reeks in Graft”, CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE, Apr. 29, 1922, at 6;
see GREGORY L. SCHNEIDER, THE CONSERVATIVE CENTURY: FROM REACTION TO REVOLUTION
17 (2009) (discussing the Tribune’s owner and editorial’s conservatism);
42. Naval Leases Under Attack, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1922, at 6.
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Interior, and why two oil corporations were permitted to drill, store, and
profit from the extraction of oil critical to national defense.43 Thus, it took
nine months for the public to learn that drilling in three of the nation’s
critical naval oil reserves were granted without an open bidding process, to
oil magnates Edward Doheny and Harry Sinclair, from the first notice that
oversight of the naval petroleum reserves were transferred to the Interior
Department.44 The public would later learn that Fall received tens of
thousands of dollars from Sinclair and Doheny, and that Fall, Sinclair, and
Doheny claimed secrecy in the leases was important to keep the Japanese
government from ascertaining the petroleum needs of the Navy.45 Fall was
a rancher, lawyer, and prospector prior to his election to the Senate.46 He
also repeatedly faced allegations of bribery and fraud before Harding
appointed him Interior Secretary.47 These actions proved problematic. On
April 15, 1923, the Senate voted to investigate the leasing of oil.48 But, it
was not until June 9 that Harding informed the Senate that he approved of
the transfer through a previously unpublished executive order.49
A. William Howard Taft: A Career in Law, Politics and the National Defense
Near the beginning of his presidency, Taft issued an executive order
setting aside two tracts of land—Elk Hills and Buena Vista—in California,
as federal oil reserves.50 The set-aside occurred following Secretary of the
Interior Robert Ballinger’s conclusion that production rates of oil would

43. See Senate Orders Inquiry into Oil Leases: Fall, Denby, and Daniels Are Expected to Appear at Public
Lands Hearing, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 192), at 5.
44. See David H. Stratton, Behind Teapot Dome: Some Personal Insights, 31 BUS. HIST. REV. 385, 387
(1957) (asserting Fall’s immediate negotiations with oil magnates after he became Secretary of the
Interior).
45. See id. at 391 (“Fall defended his personal acquisitions from Sinclair and Doheny as
legitimate loans and normal business transactions having no bearing on his leasing policy for the naval
oil reserves.”).
46. See id. at 386 (discussing Fall’s extensive experience in the oil industry).
47. BURL NOGGLE, TEAPOT DOME: OIL AND POLITICS IN THE 1920S, at 9–16 (1961).
48. See 67 CONG. REC. 5567 (1922).
49. See Harding Approves Fall-Denby Leasing of Navy Oil Lands, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1922, at 1
(“President Harding in a message to the Senate today assumed full responsibility for the leasing to
private interests of the naval oil reserve in California and in Wyoming.”).
50. See Pan-American Petroleum v. United States, 273 U.S. 456, 484–86 (1927) (discussing the
two tracts of land that were to be set aside as federal oil reserves); see also John A. DeNovo, Petroleum
and the United States Navy Before World War I, 41 MISS. HIST. REV. 641, 647 (1955) (noting that Taft
designated Elk Hills and Buena Vista as naval oil reserves in 1912); WILLIAM R. BRAISTED,
THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE PACIFIC, 1909–1922, at 38 (2008) (same).
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decrease because of oil depletion.51 Taft also had a role in the growth of
the Navy. In 1902, the United States Navy “ranked seventh amongst the
world’s” navies, but in the last year of Taft’s presidency the Navy was the
third-largest in the world.52 In 1910, Congress authorized in statute what
Taft had already accomplished with his executive order, and in 1915 the
Court in United States v. Midwest Oil Company53 upheld Taft’s—and later
President Wilson’s—authority to set aside land for the federal government’s
use or protection.54 Authored by Justice Joseph Lamar, the Court in a five
to three vote accepted that a president, as a commander in chief, had the
authority to set aside lands that had previously been open to the public for
exploration and drilling.55 Hailed as a victory for conservation, the decision
also upheld a significant national security decision that Taft, as president,
had undertaken to ensure that the Navy had a ready reserve of oil in case of
war.56
Born into a prominent Ohio family, Taft’s ascension to the chief
justiceship followed a historically unparalleled career in federal and state
government service.57 This partly explains why he became a justice at the
(then) advanced age of sixty-three.58 After his admission to the bar in 1880,
he served as Hamilton County’s prosecutor, and then in 1882,
President Chester Arthur appointed him as a federal revenue collector.59
At the age of twenty-seven, he became a state trial judge.60 In 1890,
President Benjamin Harrison appointed Taft Solicitor General of the
United States and then, two years later, as a judge on the United States Court

51. See DeNovo, supra note 50, at 646 (explaining Ballinger’s prediction that current oil
production practices are not sustainable for long term oil extractions).
52. PAOLO E. COLETTA, THE PRESIDENCY OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 210–16 (1973).
53. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
54. Id. at 483 (declaring the Executive had the power to make withdrawals).
55. Id. at 468–69.
56. See J. Leonard Bates, The Midwest Decision, 1915: A Landmark in Conservation History, 51 PAC.
NW. Q. 26, 26–27 (1960) (explaining the victory for the conservationists).
57. See TIMOTHY L HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY 275–78
(2001) (explaining Taft’s father, Alphonso Taft, had served as both Secretary of War and Attorney
General during Ulysses S. Grant’s presidency, and later as both United States Minister to AustriaHungary and Russia during Chester A. Arthur’s presidency). Additionally, Taft was educated at Yale
University as well as the Cincinnati Law School, the predecessor of the University of Cincinnati’s law
school. Id.
58. Post, supra note 27, at 3.
59. PETER RENSTROM, THE TAFT COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 72–73 (2003).
60. See Earl Warren, Chief Justice William Howard Taft, 67 YALE L. J. 353, 355 (1958) (discussing
Taft’s early legal career).
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of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.61
In 1900, Taft acceded to
President William McKinley’s request to leave the federal bench and serve
as
the
Governor
General
of
the
Philippines.62
President Theodore Roosevelt appointed Taft as Secretary of War in
1904.63 This position placed Taft in close proximity to the presidency in
both a practical and legal sense. On August 7, 1789, Congress established
the Department of War with a Cabinet Secretary in charge of the
department, and its responsibilities included ensuring the Army was capable
of defending the United States, as well as, by the time of Taft’s appointment,
governing and protecting the nation’s growing overseas empire.64
As Secretary of War, Taft not only oversaw the training and equipping of
the nation’s military forces, he also undertook responsibility for the
garrisoning of forces in the Philippines and Cuba.65 As one scholar noted,
Taft “had direct or indirect oversight over most of America’s scattered
empire.”66 Taft’s early actions, involving Japan, may have influenced his
61. Id. at 355–56 (explaining when President Benjamin Harrison appointed Taft as Solicitor
General, he had less than three years of experience as a jurist); see also DAVID HENRY BURTON, TAFT,
HOLMES, AND THE 1920S COURT 44 (1993) (explaining that the appointment was a “quantum leap”
which came about as a matter of “political grounds”).
62. JEFFREY ROSEN, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS SERIES:
THE 27TH PRESIDENT, 1909–1913, at 31–32 (2018).
63. E.g., William Howard Taft, HISTORY (June 7, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/
us-presidents/william-howard-taft [https://perma.cc/S9WL-QJMV].
64. Act to Establish the Department of War (1789). The bill read:
[Be] it enacted by the Congress of the United States, [t]hat there shall be an executive department,
to be denominated [the Department of War], and that there shall be a principal officer therein to
be called the Secretary to the United States, for the Department of War, to be removable from
office by the President of the United States, and who shall perform and execute such duties,
services, and functions, as shall, from time to time be enjoined on, or entrusted to him, by the
President of the United States, agreeable to the Constitution, relative to military commissions, or
to the troops, fortresses, or warlike stores of the United States, or to such other matters respecting
military affairs, as the President of the United States shall assign to the said department, or relative
to the granting of lands to persons entitled thereto by reason of military services rendered to the
United States, or relative to Indian affairs; [a]nd furthermore, that the said principal officers shall
conduct the business of the said department in such manner as the President of the United States
shall, from time to time, order or instruct. Id.
65. See REO MATSUZAKI, STATEBUILDING BY IMPOSITION: RESISTANCE AND CONTROL IN
COLONIAL TAIWAN AND THE PHILIPPINES 132–51 (2019) (describing Taft’s involvement with the
American occupation of the Philippines as governor and later as secretary of war); WILLIAM HOWARD
TAFT, SPECIAL REPORT OF WM. H. TAFT, SECRETARY OF WAR, TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE
PHILIPPINES 13–14 (1908) (providing there were “12,000 American soldiers in the islands . . . .”).
66. Truman R. Clark, President Taft and the Puerto Rican Appropriation Crisis of 1909, 26 AMERICAS
152, 152 (1969).
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view of the national security aspect of Fall’s, Sinclair’s, and Doheny’s fraud
as being a matter of corruption rather than a corrupt act undermining
national security. On July 27, 1905, Taft and Prime Minister of Japan,
Katsura Tarō, met in Tokyo and agreed that Japan would not make any
claim to the Philippine Islands and, in return, the United States government
recognized the importance to the Japanese government of creating a
“protectorate” over Korea.67 Taft described to Elihu Root, his predecessor
in the War Department, that “Japan’s only interest in the Philippines
would . . . be to have these islands governed by a strong and friendly nation
like the United States . . . .”68 After blaming pro-Russian propaganda for
creating a false sense of fear of Japan, Taft added that “insinuations of the
yellow peril type are nothing more or less than malicious and clumsy
slanders calculated to do mischief to Japan.”69 The agreement remained
out of the American public’s knowledge until a historian revealed its
existence in August 1924.70
The agreement between Taft and Tarō was notable for several reasons.
Both the United States and Japan were relative newcomers in creating
overseas empires, and both had extended their imperial designs into the
Pacific. In the 1870s, Japan emerged from the “Meiji Restoration” and took
steps to gain control in Korea.71 Japan’s control of Korea became complete
after its military defeated China in the first Sino-Chinese War in 1895.72
Following that conflict, Japan’s military was instrumental in the defeat of
the Boxer Rebellion and then surprisingly defeated Russia in a major war in

67. See Kirk W. Larsen & Joseph Seeley, Simple Conversation or Secret Treaty? The Taft-Katsura
Memorandum in Korean Historical Memory, 19 J. KOREAN STUD. 59, 59–60 (2014) (explaining Taft and
Katasura Tarō’s meeting led to the Taft-Katsura Memorandum); Jongsuk Chay, The Taft-Katsura
Memorandum Reconsidered, 37 PAC. HIST. REV. 321, 321–22 (1968) (“As stated in the memorandum
which was drawn up later and agreed to by both parties, the conversation had three major subjects.”).
68. See Letter from WHT, Sec. of War, to Elihu Root, Predecessor, Sec. of War under Roosevelt
and President William McKinley [Hereinafter Elihu Root] (July 29, 1905) (on file with the Library of
Congress (adding “and not to have them placed either under the misrule of the natives, yet unfit for
self-government, or in the hands of some unfriendly European power”).
69. Letter from WHT, Sec. of War, to Elihu Root (July 29, 1905) (on file with the Library of
Congress).
70. John Gilbert Reid, Taft’s Telegram to Root, July 29, 1905, 9 PAC. HIST. REV. 66, 67 (1940).
71. See Marlene J. Mayo, The Korean Crisis of 1873 and Early Meiji Foreign Policy, 31 J. ASIAN STUD.
793, 798–800 (1972) (detailing the steps Japan took to gain control in Korea).
72. S.C.M. PAINE, THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR, 1894-95: PERCEPTIONS, POWER, AND PRIMACY
5–8 (2003); S.C.M. PAINE, THE JAPANESE EMPIRE: GRAND STRATEGY FROM THE MEIJI
RESTORATION TO THE PACIFIC WAR 41–42 (2017).
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1905.73 After the agreement, in World War I, the United States and Japan
fought on the same side, and both contributed forces to the containment of
communism in Russia in 1918–1919.74
Taft was elected president in 1908, but in 1912, he lost to Woodrow
Wilson in a four-way race against Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Eugene
Debs.75 In contrast to Debs, who ran as a socialist, Roosevelt, who ran as
a liberal progressive, and Wilson, who also ran as a progressive reformer,
Taft was the most conservative of the candidates, even though he too
embraced aspects of progressivism.76 Prior to and during his presidency,
Taft sought to establish a lasting relationship with Japan.77 His other peace
efforts included aligning with steel magnate Andrew Carnegie to the point
that Carnegie contributed the large sum of $75,000 to Taft’s 1912 reelection
campaign based on Taft’s stated platform of creating an international peace
arbitration body.78 Taft’s conception of peace, however, was partly based
on commercial trade and imperialism.79 That is, as long as nations freely
engaged in commerce, war would be unlikely. And because of China’s
instability, he welcomed Japan’s position of strength in the Eastern
Pacific.80
From 1913 until 1920 when Harding nominated Taft as Chief Justice,
Taft taught at Yale, remained active in the law, and generally supported

73. See, e.g., JOHN ALBERT WHITE, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 186
(2015) (explaining the Russian surrender to the Japanese resulting in the end of the war).
74. See CARL J. RICHARD, WHEN THE UNITED STATES INVADED RUSSIA: WOODROW
WILSON’S SIBERIAN DISASTER 81 (2013) (describing the dispatch of American and Japanese troops
along the Siberian border).
75. United States Presidential Election of 1912, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
event/United-States-presidential-election-of-1912 [https://perma.cc/QV4P-HMRV].
76. Id.; see JONATHAN LURIE, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: THE TRAVAILS OF A PROGRESSIVE
CONSERVATIVE 153 (2011) (noting Taft considered himself a progressive conservative).
77. See Ralph Eldin Minger, Taft’s Missions to Japan: A Study in Personal Diplomacy, 30 PAC. HIST.
REV. 279, 291–92 (1961) (explaining several tactics Taft used to establish a relationship with Japan).
78. DAVID NASAW, ANDREW CARNEGIE 742–65 (2006).
79. See ELLEN D. TILLMAN, DOLLAR DIPLOMACY BY FORCE: NATION-BUILDING AND
RESISTANCE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1 (2016) (explaining the original idea of dollar
diplomacy); DANA G. MUNRO, INTERVENTION AND DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN THE CARIBBEAN 19001921, at 162–63 (1964) (discussing the promotion of the United States’ political objectives regarding
dollar diplomacy).
80. See ATUL KOHLI, IMPERIALISM AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: HOW BRITAIN AND THE
UNITED STATES SHAPED THE GLOBAL PERIPHERY 247 (2020) (discussing China’s instability and
Japan’s rise to power in the region).
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Wilson’s efforts to have the country join the League of Nations.81 Thus, in
addition to having taken a role in national security policy, Taft also believed
that international arbitration and laws could prevent a war from occurring.82
After he left the presidency and while teaching at Yale, Taft served as
president of the League to Enforce Peace.83 The League advocated, among
other ideas, for the establishment of an international court to enforce
treaties and settle disputes between nations.84 He encouraged Harding to
enter into an international maritime arms limitations treaty known—as
further addressed below—as the Washington Naval Treaty.85 After
World War I, it became commonplace to think that the prewar battleship
arms race—which led to a quest for oceanic hegemony—was one of the
causes of the war.86 Although an agreement for naval reductions took place
in 1922, the battleship remained central both to the United States’ defense
and a projected war against Japan (or even Britain in which oil became a
crucial naval commodity).
“Taft’s reputation for supporting international peace negotiations [had
become so broad, it] led to Tomas Masyryk, the first president of
Czechoslovakia, and President Eleftherios Kyriakou Venizelos, the

81. Donald F. Anderson, Building National Consensus: The Career of William Howard Taft, 68 U. CIN.
L. REV. 323, 344 (2000).
82. See, e.g., James Hindman, The General Arbitration Treaties of William Howard Taft,
36 HISTORIAN 52, 52 (1973) (“Taft spoke before [Theodore] Marburg’s society, saying that ‘if we do
not have arbitration, we shall have war.’”).
83. See William Howard Taft, League to Enforce Peace, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF WILLIAM
HOWARD TAFT: TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 3 (Frank X. Gerrity ed., 2003) (providing
the Proposal of the League to Enforce Peace).
84. See RUHL J. BARTLETT, THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE, at v (1944) (offering a solution
when deciding “what place [the United States] should take in world affairs”).
85. See Letter from WHT, Prof., Yale L. School, to HT (Nov. 29, 1921) (on file with the Library
of Congress). Taft wrote to Horace:
I saw Harding yesterday. He is very serious about the Conference and tells me that things are
working well and that they are going to get something real out of it. He complained that Borah
and others were, as he said, “crabbing” the situation. I told him I would send him a little
memorandum I had of what Lincoln said about complaints of an Administration in order to cheer
him up at times. As Root told me that he thought the thing as going to be a success, Harding’s
assurance is a confirmation.
Id.
86. See, e.g., John H. Maurer, Arms Control and the Anglo-German Naval Race Before World War I:
Lessons for Today? 112 POL. SCI. Q. 285, 285 (1997) (explaining England and Germany’s competition of
building battleships before World War I).
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president of Greece, asking him to campaign for the League of Nations.”87
By 1927, he had been a part of (or observed) the United States and Japan
acting harmoniously, and as a result, may have discounted the claims of
officials in the Harding administration who claimed that secrecy, regarding
the naval petroleum leases, was important as a matter of national security.
B. United States Naval Policy: Oil-Fired Battlefleets and Mahan’s Doctrine
The office of Secretary of the Navy was established as a separate cabinet
department on April 30, 1798, to alleviate the Secretary of War of
responsibility over the United States’ naval defense.88 In 1842, Congress
enacted a statute authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to establish and
construct coal depots to supply the nation’s warships.89 Congress’s action
was a response to Secretary of the Navy Abel Upshur’s efforts to modernize
the Navy by converting it from sail power to steam propulsion.90 The Navy
had made a vital contribution to the defeat of the Confederacy in 1865, and
shortly after the end of the war, naval policy centered on the question of
whether there would be a future war with Great Britain.91 However, by the
1870s, naval budgets began to shrink as war with Britain or another
European power appeared unlikely.92 To be sure, in 1873, there was a brief
“war scare” with Spain resulting from the Virginius Affair, but this brief
crisis was diplomatically resolved.93
European imperialism and the corresponding growth of their navies
resulted in a gradual retooling and enlargement of the United States Navy
87. Joshua Kastenberg, National Security and Judicial Ethics: The Exception to the Rule of Keeping
Judicial Conduct Judicial and the Politicization of the Judiciary, 12 ELON L. J. 282, 304 n.122 (2020) (citing
Letter from WHT to Thomas Mazaryk, First President of Czechoslovakia (Sep. 23, 1919) and Letter
from WHT to Eleftherios Kyriakou Venizelos, President of Greece (Sep. 23, 1919) (on file with the
Library of Congress)).
88. See ROBERT BRENT MOSHER, EXECUTIVE REGISTER OF THE UNITED STATES
1789–1902, at 59–60 (1903) (providing the “Act to establish an Executive Department, to be
denominated the Department of the Navy”).
89. See 9 Rev. Stat. § 1552 (1842) (repealed 1913) (reading “[t]he Secretary of the Navy may
establish at such places as he may deem necessary, suitable for depots of coal, and other fuel, for the
supply of steamships at war”).
90. See NORMA LOIS PETERSON, THE PRESIDENCIES OF WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON AND
JOHN TYLER 151 (1989) (discussing Upshur’s modernization efforts); Matthew J. Karp, Slavery and
American Sea Power: The Navalist Impulse in the Antebellum South, 77 J. S. HIST. 283, 312–16 (2011) (noting
that Upshur and other southerners partly wanted an expanded Navy to protect slavery).
91. KENNETH J. HAGAN, THIS PEOPLE’S NAVY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SEA POWER
177–79 (1991).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 180–81.
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beginning in 1883 with the construction of four armored cruisers, powered
primarily by coal generated steam.94 In 1885, President Grover Cleveland
convinced Congress to fund newer and heavier armored ships like the
armored cruiser Maine, which became central to the war with Spain in
1898.95 Following Spain’s defeat, the United States held possessions across
the Pacific Ocean including Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines, and the
Navy became essential in maintaining these possessions in the United States’
control.96 In 1901, a brief war scare with Chile erupted over the “Baltimore
incident,” and had war occurred, the Navy would have steamed thousands
of miles to South America.97 In 1903, President Roosevelt’s naval advisors
called for the construction of forty-eight battleships with commensurate
numbers of smaller supporting vessels.98
Although in 1903, the battleships would have been powered by coal, by
1915, new naval battleships were constructed to be powered by oil.99
A similar process of moving from coal to oil occurred with Britain’s Royal
Navy.100 In 1885, naval engineers started to urge the adoption of petroleum
as a substitute for coal since it burned faster and delivered more power for
ship acceleration.101 In 1897, Congress opened up federal lands for oil
exploration and purchase.102 One year later, Congress allocated the small

94. Id. at 185–86.
95. WALTER R. HERRICK, JR., THE AMERICAN NAVAL REVOLUTION 33–37 (1966).
96. HAGAN, supra note 91, at 227; see also HERRICK, supra note 95, at 105 (discussing American
annexation of Hawaii).
97. See HAGAN, supra note 91, at 198–200.
98. See, e.g., UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS, ESTIMATES SUBMITTED BY THE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY: HEARINGS BEFORE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES 569 (1914) [hereinafter ESTIMATES SUBMITTED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY] (explaining the recommendations made by Admiral C.E. Vreeland regarding the battleship
fleet).
99. See ROBERT K. MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT: BRITAIN, GERMANY, AND THE COMING OF
THE GREAT WAR 784–85 (1991) (explaining how the use of oil in small vessels led the way to bigger
vessels using oil instead of coal).
100. Id. at 784-86 (“Converting dreadnoughts to oil meant giving them greater speed; it also
meant basing British naval supremacy on a fuel obtainable only from overseas.”).
101. HERRICK, supra note 95, at 32–33.
102. Act of February 11, 1897, ch. 216, 29 Stat. 526 (current version codified at 30 U.S.C.
§ 161). This act reads:
Any person authorized to enter lands under the mining laws of the United States may enter and
obtain patent to lands containing petroleum or other mineral oils, and chiefly valuable therefor
under the provisions of the laws relating to placer mineral claims: Provided, That lands containing
such petroleum or other mineral oils which have heretofore been filed upon, claimed or improved
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sum of $15,000 to investigate the practicality of converting the Navy from
coal to oil.103 In 1904, Secretary of the Navy, Paul Morton, informed
Congress that oil enabled longer cruising ranges of vessels and less crew.104
However, when, in December 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt ordered
a fleet of battleships and other vessels—known as the “Great White Fleet”
for the painting scheme on the vessels—to sail around the world, all of the
capital ships were coal-powered and reliant on fuel resupply from British
and other European sources.105
Another important change occurred in naval expenditures and
construction. In 1905, the Royal Navy—the name given to the Navy of the
British Empire—began to build a revolutionary battleship titled as the
Dreadnought.106 The Dreadnought, when completed, became the largest and
most powerful surface vessel of any Navy in terms of size, speed, armament,
and armor.107 Before long, the governments of Germany, France, Italy,
Japan, and the United States began to construct navies based on the British
Dreadnaught design, and a naval arms race ensued.108
as mineral but not yet patented, may be held and patented under the provisions of this act the
same as if such filing, claim, or improvement were subsequent to the date of the passage hereof.
Id.
103. See DeNovo, supra note 50, at 641 (citing Act of May 4, 1898, Pub. L. No. 76, 54th Cong.
2d Sess, and explaining the allocation for the following: experiments with liquid fuel on steam tug,
New York Yard; experiments with liquid fuel on two torpedo boats, fifteen thousand dollars).
104. Id. at 642–43 (suggesting a transition from coal to oil, even though Morton did not
advocate for a rapid transition); see also GERALD D. NASH, UNITED STATES OIL POLICY, 1890–1964:
BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 10 (1968) (describing why the
transition to oil was criticized, despite oil providing significant advantages over coal).
105. See RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR: A HISTORY OF UNITED
STATES MILITARY STRATEGY AND POLICY 188–89 (1973) (showing how the Great White Fleet was a
major achievement in that time); Christopher McMahon, The Great White Fleet Sails Today? Twenty-First
Century Logistics Lessons from the 1907–1909 Voyage of the Great White Fleet, 71 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV.
67, 73–74 (2018) (giving details of how the ships in the Great White Fleet operated); Oreste Foppiani,
The World Cruise of the U.S. Navy in 1907–1908, 71 IL POLITICO 110, 115–16 (2006) (“[T]he world tour
of the battle fleet of 1907-1909 . . . transformed [the US Navy] from a joke into a war machine.”).
106. MASSIE, supra note 99, at 468–69 (offering a description as to the size and strength of the
Dreadnought).
107. See id. at 470–71 (“Being a battleship, she will have to fight other battleships. Having speed
she can choose the range at which she will fight.”); see also Holger Herwig, The German Reaction to the
Dreadnought Revolution, 13 INT’L HIST. REV. 273–74 (1991) (offering a comparison to the German
creation of a similar dreadnought-type battleship); RICHARD HOUGH, THE GREAT WAR AT SEA:
1914–1918, at 1–12 (1984) (“Germany has been paralyzed by the Dreadnought,’ Admiral Sir John Fisher,
First Sea Lord wrote gloatingly . . . .”).
108. See WEIGLEY, supra note 105, at 188 (providing an example of how the United States
decided to build battleships after the Dreadnought model); Matthew Seligmann, Intelligence Information and
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In 1914, during a hearing on future naval estimates, Admiral Robert S.
Griffin, the chief of the Navy’s Bureau of Steam Engineering, testified that
although two of the Navy’s newest battleships, the Oklahoma and the Nevada,
were the only oil-burning battleships in the fleet, oil had become critical to
the national defense. “[A] supply of oil is absolutely necessary for us and is
becoming more and more necessary every year, because all of the vessels we
are now building are exclusively oil burners,” he warned.109
Contemporaneously, Admiral T.J. Cowie, the chief of the Navy’s Bureau of
Supplies and Accounts, testified that the advantages of oil over coal were
the “[a]bility to maintain high speed as long as fuel lasts, better construction
of vessel, saving of weight, absence of smoke and noninterference with
gunnery, reduction of the complement [size of the ship’s crew, and ] ease
and cleanliness of refueling.”110
In 1916, with the World War in its second year, and the United States
maintaining a tenuous neutrality, President Wilson announced that the
United States would build a “Navy second to none.”111 Less than a year
later, at his request, Congress declared war on the Imperial German
government and eventually, its allies: the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the
Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria.112 The United States entered World War I
the 1909 Naval Scare: The Secret Foundations of a Public Panic, 17 WAR IN HIST. 37, 40–41 (2010)
(“Intelligence received on the German naval armaments industry suggested that a formidable new
competitor had emerged” leading to new “naval shipbuilding capabilities”); Charles H. Fairbanks Jr.,
The Origins of the Dreadnought Revolution: A Historiographical Essay, 13 INT’L HIST. REV. 246, 247 (1991)
(providing insight from World War I military historians).
109. See ESTIMATES SUBMITTED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, supra note 97, at 325
(“All the ships we build will be oil burners, and unless we are sure of a cheaper supply of oil our fuel
bills are going to mount up very rapidly.”).
110. Id. at 123.
111. Naval Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 556 (1916); see also WEIGLEY, supra note 105, at 244 (explaining
Wilson’s neutrality within the building program that began in 1916); ADAM TOOZE, THE DELUGE:
THE GREAT WAR, AMERICA, AND THE REMAKING OF THE GLOBAL ORDER, 1916–1931, at 35–36
(2014) (“Wilson’s view was blunt: ‘let us build a [N]avy bigger than hers and do what we please.’”);
EDWARD M. COFFMAN, THE WAR TO END ALL WARS: THE AMERICAN MILITARY EXPERIENCE IN
WORLD WAR I, at 87 (1968) (discussing that according to Professor Coffman, Wilson actually called
for “incomparably the greatest [N]avy in the world”); HAROLD & MARGARET SPROUT, THE RISE OF
AMERICAN NAVAL POWER, 1776–1918 334 (1939) (describing Wilson’s expansion of the Navy as an
“armament program without precedent in American history”); Jerry W. Jones, The Naval Battle of Paris,
62 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 77, 77–78 (2009) (“The challenge to British naval supremacy alarmed the
British and nearly alienated the European partner most sympathetic to Wilson’s vision of the peace.”).
112. See Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Woodrow Wilson, Fifth Annual Message, AMER.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Dec. 4, 1917), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29558
[https://perma.cc/3KKC-Z2K6] (“We must meet its force with our own and regard the Central
Powers as but one . . . . They also are the tools of Germany.”).
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with one of the largest navies in the world.113 It had been constructed
almost as a mirror of the Royal Navy, replete with modern battleships.114
With a degree of prescience, in 1915, Secretary of the Navy, Josephus
Daniels, designated the Teapot Dome oil area as a naval reserve to provide
a ready supply of oil for the Navy in case of war.115 Beginning in late 1917,
part of the U.S. Navy served alongside the Royal Navy in blockading
Germany.116 Although Wilson pushed for the establishment of a League
of Nations and sought peace during the Versailles negotiations, he also
continued to plan for the United States to possess the world’s most powerful
Navy.117
After Wilson’s failure to have the United States join the League of
Nations, President Harding pursued disarmament through a series of
treaties by inviting the governments of the world’s major powers—Britain,
France, Italy, and Japan, as well as the governments of Portugal, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and China—to Washington D.C.118 This conference
produced the Four-Power Treaty between the United States and the
governments of Great Britain, Japan, and France.119 As a result, Japan was
assured of the continued possession of the Korean Peninsula and likewise,
the United States would retain the Philippines and Guam.120 The treaty
113. LEE A. CRAIG, JOSEPHUS DANIELS: HIS LIFE &TIMES 231 (2013).
114. See id. (“[Theodore Roosevelt’s] obsession with a big [N]avy helped propel the United
States from the world’s twelfth-largest [N]avy in the late nineteenth century to the third-largest by
1914.”); James C. Bradford, Last of the Independent Naval Diplomats, in ADMIRALS OF THE NEW STEEL
NAVY: MAKERS OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL TRADITION 263–71 (James C. Bradford, ed., 2012).
115. See Craig, supra note 113, at 242 (explaining Daniels’s solution to the nation’s oil needs).
116. See ROBERT K. MASSIE, CASTLES OF STEEL: BRITAIN, GERMANY, AND THE WINNING
OF THE GREAT WAR AT SEA 689–92, 695–700 (2003) (explaining the peace efforts by Wilson and how
peace efforts ultimately led to the U.S. in battle alongside Britain); COFFMAN, supra note 111, at 96–99
(“The American contribution to the convoy operation was an integral part of the Allied system.”).
117. The Washington Naval Conference, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/
milestones/1921–1936/naval-conference [https://perma.cc/TT4X-XQ9E].
118. See Winston B. Thorson, Pacific Northwest Opinion of the Washington Naval Conference of
1921–1922, 37 PAC. NW. Q. 109, 109−10 (1946) (noting in the aftermath of World War II, the Naval
Treaty proved unpopular because it was believed to have weakened the United States military and given
Japan an advantage). The conference also resulted in the Washington Submarine Treaty. See generally
Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, art. V, Feb. 6, 1922,
25 L.N.T.S. 202 (1922) (providing, in relevant part, for the protection of the lives of neutrals and
noncombatants at sea in time of war and prevention of use of war noxious gases and chemicals).
119. See generally Insular Possessions and Dominions in the Pacific (Four-Power Treaty), art. I,
Dec. 13, 1921, 43 Stat. 1646 (providing an overview of the contents of the treaty).
120. See J. Chal Vinson, The Parchment Peace: The Senate Defense of the Four-Power Treaty of the
Washington Conference, 39 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 303, 308 (1952) (offering why the Four-Power treaty
made it unnecessary to fortify Guam).
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had the effect of curbing Japanese expansion in the Pacific, a main goal of
the State Department.121 Also, the majority of the Senate, in voting for the
treaty, believed it was an important agreement to narrow the possibility of a
new war.122
As part of the Washington Conference on February 6, 1922, the
governments of France, Italy, Japan, the United States, and Britain signed a
naval treaty proportioning naval strength in which the United States and
Britain would each possess a tonnage ratio that roughly equated to five
capitol ships to Japan’s three, and France and Italy would have 1.75 tons
respectively.123 Put another way, the battleship and battle-cruiser (a less
armored but faster type of battleship) fleets of the United States and Great
Britain could not exceed 525,000 tons, and Japan was limited to 310,000
tons.124 While the Washington Naval Treaty proved publicly popular—and
Taft supported it—the Navy’s response is important in placing the national
security aspects of Teapot Dome into context. After learning of Harding’s
plans for naval disarmament, Secretary of the Navy, Edwin Denby sought
the advice of the Navy’s senior leadership, many of whom were opposed to
the treaty.125
Some of the Navy’s senior leaders warned that Japan, as well as Britain,
were “grave menaces to American security.”126 In 1902, the governments
of Britain and Japan signed a treaty in which one nation would come to the
aid of the other, unless the basis for the conflict involved Russian aggression
121. Id. at 308 (describing how the Four-Power treaty prevented Japan from expanding into the
Pacific).
122. See id. at 305–306 (offering substantial information on the goals of the Four Power Treaty
and the interest in peace).
123. See Limitation of Naval Armament (Five-Power Treaty or Washington Treaty) art. 4,
Feb. 6, 1922, 43 Stat. 1655, at 353 (“The total ship replacement tonnage of each of the Contracting
Powers shall not exceed [the following].”); RICHARD W. FANNING, PEACE AND DISARMAMENT:
NAVAL RIVALRY AND ARMS CONTROL 1922–1933, at 3–7 (1995) (“The Five-Power Treaty established
ratios in capital ships of 5-5-3-1.75-1.75 for the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy.”);
see also DUDLEY W. KNOX, THE ECLIPSE OF AMERICAN SEA POWER 28 (1922) (describing bases for
5-5-3 ratio). The actual tonnage ratio was 500,000 tons to Japan’s 300,000 with Italy and France at
175,000. BRAYTON HARRIS, THE AGE OF THE BATTLESHIP 1890–1922, at 203 (2015).
124. LARRY H. ADDINGTON, THE PATTERNS OF WAR SINCE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
174 (2d ed. 1994); see also Donald G. White, The Misapplication of a Weapons System: The Battle Cruiser as a
Warship Type, 23 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 42, 47–49 (1970) (establishing the difference between the
battleship and battlecruiser).
125. See Ernest Andrade Jr., The United States Navy and the Washington Naval Conference, 31 THE
HISTORIAN 345, 346 (1969) (“Denby asked the Board to consider a number of questions relating to
armaments limitation.”).
126. Id. at 347.
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over Korea or Britain’s defense of its colony, India.127 Even if, the Navy’s
leaders stressed, the Washington Conference resulted in the termination of
the 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance, the Navy would have to achieve parity
with the British Navy and still be able “to contemplate war” with Japan.128
Testifying to the House on March 31, 1920, Admiral Bradley Fiske, a
commander in the Navy’s Atlantic fleet, implored Congress to continue with
Wilson’s naval plans prior to signing a disarmament agreement.129 At the
same time, a retired naval captain, Dudley Knox, published a book
condemning the treaty for placing the United States in a disadvantaged
position and enabling Japanese aggression.130 The treaty was signed despite
the Navy’s protests, and the need for the naval petroleum reserves remained.
On December 8, 1922, Denby realigned the Navy to place the bulk of its
battleships in the Pacific. But the Pacific ports were unprepared for the
larger naval presence, which meant a buildup in Hawaii.131 In terms of
naval personnel movement to western ports and the possibility of war, “[i]n
1922, the U.S. Navy consisted of 7,855 officers and 89,482 enlisted
sailors.”132 Sending a fraction of these sailors to the Pacific would have
also entailed the use of oil.
There is one more matter important to naval policy. While presidents
and the legislative branch are responsible for the size of the Navy, no
examination of naval policy, or foreign policy for that matter, at the time of
the scandal can be understood without acknowledging the influence of

127. See Charles Nelson Spinks, The Termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 6 PAC. HIST. REV.
321, 321–22 (1937) (explaining the relationship between Britain and Japan during the early 1900s);
Jonathan P. Dolliver, Significance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 174 N. AM. REV. 594, 602 (1902) (noting
how Senator Dolliver (R-IA) insisted that the treaty was a means to warn Russia from dismembering
China).
128. Andrade Jr., supra note 125, at 347.
129. See Naval Investigation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Naval Affairs, 66th Cong.
678–84 (1920) (describing proposed development of pre-war military strategy to make U.S. forces
immediately deployable upon declarations of war).
130. KNOX, supra note 123, at 131–40. Before Knox authored this book, he wrote an editorial
warning that the reduction in naval personnel had led to the superiority of British and Japanese sailors
in terms of training and war readiness. See Dudley Knox, The Limited Navy: Personnel and Efficiency Still
of Great Importance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1921, at 18 [hereinafter The Limited Navy] (condemning the
reduction of naval personnel).
131. WILLIAM STILL, VICTORY WITHOUT PEACE: THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN EUROPEAN
WATERS, 1919–1924, at 9 (2017); Gerald E. Wheeler, The United States Navy and the Japanese “Enemy”:
1919–1931, 21 MIL. AFFS. 61, 74 (1957).
132. JOHN T. KUEHN, AGENTS OF INNOVATION: THE GENERAL BOARD AND THE DESIGN
OF THE FLEET THAT DEFEATED THE JAPANESE NAVY 9 (2008).
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Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan.133 Prior to World War II, the militaries of
the “Great Powers” were built and utilized along the lines of a small number
of influential military theorists. Carl Von Clausewitz, a Prussian officer who
fought against Napoleon and later authored Vom Kriege (On War), and
Antoine-Henri Jomini, a French-Swiss who fought in Napoleon’s armies
and then authored the Art of War, dominated Army policy and strategy, and
to a degree the foreign policies of the Great Powers.134 In 1890, Mahan
authored The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, in which he focused on the
years 1660 to 1783.135 Mahan, interestingly, was raised near the United
States Military Academy where his father, Dennis Hart Mahan, was a
distinguished professor and military theorist for the Army and conveyed to
future officers the importance of Jomini to campaign planning.136
Mahan’s naval doctrine was partly based on the United States’ growing
economy and population with an attendant growth of international
commerce.137 He noted that while the United States had a leading role in
the world’s commerce, it was reliant on foreign shipping and foreign navies
for its protection.138 Later in his life, he authored The Problem of Asia: Its
Effect upon International Politics, in which he described the development of
China—the establishment of western institutions and Christianity—as a
duty of the western nations and Japan.139 And he opposed Russian
expansion, believing that Japan would be instrumental in containing Russia

133. See Walter LaFerber, A Note on the “Mercantilist Imperialism” of Alfred Thayer Mahan, 48 MISS.
VALLEY HIST. REV. 674, 674 (1962) (noting that Mahan influenced Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot
Lodge, John Hay, and at least two secretaries of the Navy); see also Peter Karsten, The Nature of
“Influence”: Roosevelt, Mahan and the Concept of Sea Power, 23 AM. Q. 585, 589 (1971) (arguing Roosevelt
praised Mahan and the two men worked in a partnership for naval growth).
134. Mark T. Calhoun, Clausewitz and Jomini: Contrasting Intellectual Frameworks in Military Theory,
80 ARMY HIST. 22, 23 (2011).
135. See PAUL M. KENNEDY, MAHAN VERSUS MACKINDER: TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF
BRITISH SEA POWER, IN STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY 41, 43–44 (1974) (providing greater clarity on
Mahan’s purpose). See generally A.T. MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY,
1660–1783, at 1 (1890) (“The clash of interests, the angry feelings roused by conflicting attempts thus
to appropriate the larger share, if not the whole, of the advantages of commerce [by sea], and of distant
unsettled commercial regions, led to wars.”).
136. See SUZANNE GEISSLER, GOD AND SEA POWER: THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON
ALFRED THAYER MAHAN 7 (2015) (offering a detailed history of the Mahan family).
137. See LaFerber, supra note 133, at 678–79 (offering an explanation on the growth of the
United States economy).
138. See MAHAN, supra note 135, at 83 (describing the U.S. ships of war as “land birds, unable
to fly far from their own shores” without foreign establishments).
139. Tyler Dennett, Mahan’s “The Problem of Asia”, 13 FOREIGN AFFS. 464, 465–66 (1935).
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from further expansion into China and along the far Western Pacific.140
President McKinley appointed Mahan as a representative to the 1899 Hague
Peace Conference as well.141
As for Mahan’s influence on naval policies, he envisioned a powerful
Navy to secure the nation’s commercial power.142 This required overseas
ports in places such as Hawaii and the Philippines.143 Indeed, Mahan
argued to the Senate that it was critical for the United States to annex
Hawaii, claiming the islands were “one of the most important strategic
points in the world.”144 If war occurred with another nation, control of the
seas would be paramount to a United States victory, if not survival.145
Rather than engage in commerce raiding, the Navy had to concentrate its
most powerful ships into a massed fleet and seek a decisive battle.146 Based
on Mahan’s ideas, in 1913, a war was to occur with Germany, and the United
States response was to lure the German fleet into the Caribbean and destroy
it.147 Known as “War Plan Black,” its planners also noted that the German
Navy could not transport enough coal for its fleet to reach the proposed site
of battle.148 “War Plan Black” was only one of several United States war
plans, which were titled in a “color scheme.”149
Although Mahan, like Taft, did not specifically focus on Japan as a future
enemy, naval leadership considered Japan as a likely adversary as early as

140. Id. at 467–68. Dennett wrote, “In Washington it had become apparent by 1920 that
cooperation with Japan to secure peace in China would always fail because of Japan’s published desire
to dominate China both politically and commercially. . . . Neither Hong Kong nor the Philippines are
now regarded as strategically located. Japan, not Russia, is the aggressor.” Id. at 468.
141. See, e.g., David D. Caron, War and International Adjudication: Reflections on the 1899 Peace
Conference, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 4, 13, 30 (2000) (noting certain members of the U.S. delegation present at
the 1899 Conference).
142. Dennett, supra note 139, at 469.
143. See Bradford, supra note 114, at 46–49 (discussing Mahan’s vision for American military
and economic influence through Pacific islands).
144. S. Rep. No. 681, at 39 (1898), in 7 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789−1901, at 285 (1901).
145. George W. Baer, U.S. Naval Strategy 1890–1945, 44 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 6, 7 (1991).
146. Id. at 10.
147. Id. at 12.
148. Id.
149. See Louis Morton, War Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy, 11 WORLD POL. 221, 222 (1959)
(explaining the series of “color plans” which “usually corresponded to the code name of the nation
involved”); see also Michael Vlahos, The Naval War College and the Origins of War-Planning Against Japan,
33 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 23, 23–24 (1980) (recounting two war strategies and the corresponding
opposing nations: “Black” against Germany, and “Orange” against Japan).
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1907 in crafting War Plan Orange.150 By 1920, the Navy’s leadership
focused on Japan as the most likely enemy.151 In 1923, the Navy possessed
eighteen battleships, and it had begun a modernization program to convert
its older coal-burning vessels to oil.152 That same year, the Department of
the Navy began its first of several “Fleet Problem” exercises in order to
prepare for a future war.153 The fleet exercises were designed around the
concept that in a future war, the Navy would have to “move a large fleet
across the Pacific, absorb or avoid Japanese attritional attacks, . . . and retain
sufficient fighting strength to defeat Japan’s” remaining naval defense
forces, and impose a blockade, which would force Japan’s surrender.154 If
“War Plan Orange” were to be initiated, immense quantities of oil would be
essential.
The Navy publicized its fleet exercises during the period of the Teapot
Dome appeals, which made it likely Taft knew of the Navy’s increased use
of oil in case of war. In late 1922, Denby announced to the nation that the
Navy would begin to conduct battle simulation exercises and that all
eighteen of the Navy’s battleships would be involved in defending the
Panama Canal.155 On March 17, 1923, the New York Times headlined that
fifteen battleships and dozens of smaller vessels staged a mock invasion of
the Panama Canal area in the first large post-war naval exercise.156 The
press reported another battleship exercise off the coast of Panama in
1925.157 In May 1927, the Navy staged a mock invasion of the East
Coast.158 Given the widespread reporting on the Navy’s activities in the
period between 1921 and 1927, it was evident that its battleships were still
150. Vlahos, supra note 149, at 31.
151. WEIGLEY, supra note 105, at 245; see ALBERT A. NOFI, TO TRAIN THE FLEET FOR WAR:
THE U.S. NAVY FLEET PROBLEMS, 1923−1940, at 19 (2010) (naval tactical training focused primarily
on Japan); BRAISTED, supra note 50, at 466 (2008) (denoting naval leadership’s concern that American
and Japanese press were causing heightened tensions).
152. NOFI, supra note 151, at 11–12.
153. See id. at 51 (“The objectives of the problem were to train leaders in the conduct of largescale operations, to examine war plans and tactical doctrine, and to exercise the fleet . . . .”); see also
Trent Hone, The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922–1941, 67 J. MIL. HIST. 1107,
1108–09 (2003) (detailing the development of battleship tactical doctrine from the study of fleet action).
154. Trent Hone, U.S. Navy Surface Battle Doctrine and Victory in the Pacific, 62 NAVAL WAR COLL.
REV. 67, 67 (2009).
155. Battle Fleet Tests Jutland Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1923, at 1.
156. Id.
157. Great War Dogs of East Ready for Battle: Battle Near in Navy Game, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1925,
at 4.
158. Army Defends Coast Against Fleet Attack, WASH. POST, May 16, 1927, at 3.
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the primary instrument of war, and this meant the naval oil remained
important to the national defense.
C. The Teapot Dome Scandal’s Timeline
The scandal arose, in one sense, because Fall’s grant of two secretive bids
was contrary to long-standing policy. In 1809, Congress articulated a broad
requirement that naval and War Department contracting be both advertised
to the public and competitive.159 Moreover, the law required the treasury,
war, and naval departments to report contracting to Congress annually.160
In 1829, Attorney General John Berrien issued an opinion advising the
government that “Congress intended, by the act of 1809, to throw additional
guards around this subject; to prevent favoritism, and to give to the United
States the benefit of competition between those who were disposed to
render the services or furnish the supplies which the [g]overnment might
require.”161 Thus, the secretive leases to Doheny’s Pan-American
Petroleum and Sinclair’s Mammoth Oil violated these laws, though no
person was specifically charged for such violation.
In another sense, the scandal was noticed because neither the issue of
naval petroleum nor the Veterans’ Bureau were the Harding administration’s
first scandal. In September 1921, a national from Germany claimed the
government had illegally seized assets of the American Metals
Corporation.162 During World War I, the properties of German or other
enemy companies based in the United States, were held by a presidential
appointee titled the Alien Property Custodian.163 After the property
159. Act of March 3, 1809, 10th Cong. ch. 28 § 5 (1809). The act reads:
That all purchases and contracts for supplies or services which are or may, according to law, be
made by, or under the direction of either the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War, or
the Secretary of the Navy, shall be made either by open purchase, or by previously advertising for
proposals respecting the same . . . .
Id.
160. Id.
161. See 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 257 (1829) (opining to the Secretary of the Navy, based on
Attorney General Berrien’s study of public newspapers and congressional documents).
162. See Frank M. Tuerkheimer, The Executive Investigates Itself, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 597, 603 (1977)
(providing an account of former Attorney General Daugherty being accused of fraud); see also JAMES
N. GIGLIO, H.M. DAUGHERTY AND THE POLITICS OF EXPEDIENCY 183 (1978) (“The American
Metal Company decision was first questioned in June 1922, when Charles Calvert . . . complained to
Harding that Daugherty and Miller had allowed claims for reasons other than a fair consideration of
the facts.”).
163. GIGLIO, supra note 162, at 181.
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custodian released seven million dollars of the company’s assets to the
claimant, Harding asked Daugherty to look into the release and Daugherty,
in turn, claimed the release was merited.164 Following Daugherty’s
resignation on March 28, 1924, an investigation ordered by his successor,
Harlan Fiske Stone, uncovered that the claimant had paid $391,000 worth
of Liberty Bonds to a prominent Republican, and the bonds had been placed
in a bank managed by Harry’s brother, Mally Daugherty.165 Liberty Bond
payments to Mally Daugherty’s bank would also become an issue in the
Teapot Dome Scandal.
On November 14, 1921, Sinclair, along with Robert Stewart of Standard
Oil and two other associates, travelled to Canada and formed the
Continental Trading Company.166 This company would later become a
vehicle to transfer Liberty Bonds—bonds issued by the United States
government during World War I—from Sinclair to Fall’s son-in-law, M.T.
Everhart, and then on to Fall.167 Although Fall was not part of the
Continental Trading Company’s formation, it became clear that by moving
financial instruments through Canada, Sinclair hoped to shield his
transactions with Fall from the United States government.168 By 1924,
newspapers such as the Atlanta Journal & Constitution reported that Fall had
received Liberty Bonds from both Doheny and Sinclair.169
On February 25, 1920, Congress passed the Mineral Leasing Act.170 It
permitted the federal government to lease its land to persons to drill for oil
or mine for other minerals. On June 4, 1920, Congress passed a bill into
law authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to conserve, develop, and use the

164. Id. at 182–83.
165. Id. at 183.
166. SALT CREEK OIL FIELD, WYOMING: HEARINGS ON S. RES. 202 BEFORE THE S. COMM.
ON PUB. LANDS AND SURVS., 70th Cong. 341 (1928) [hereinafter SALT CREEK OIL FIELD].
167. Id. at 342.
168. See Fred Thompson, Why America’s Military Base Structure Cannot Be Reduced, 48 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 557, 561 (1988) (alluding to the parties’ intent to hide transactions from the government in saying,
“it is possible that the Teapot Dome Scandal was ultimately caused by too much red tape, not too
little”); see also Stratton, supra note 44, at 387 (characterizing Fall’s transactions as being conducted
“surreptitiously ”); see also Robert T. McCracken, Owen J. Roberts—Master Advocate, 104 U. PENN. L.
REV. 322, 328 (1955) (listing obstacles to tracing the bonds such as claims of privilege, claims of
ignorance, and party refusal to testify).
169. Federal Counsel Bares New Deals Involving Fall, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 2, 1924, at 1.
170. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66–146, 41 Stat. 437 (1920) (current version
available at 30 U.S.C. § 181).
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oil on the three naval reserves.171 The law also enabled the Secretary to
exchange and sell the oil for the benefit of the United States.172 Although
the Act of June 4, 1920, maintained control of naval oil in the Department
of the Navy, Fall would later claim the Mineral Leasing Act permitted the
Interior Secretary to gain control. Harding apparently, but silently, agreed
with Fall, and as previously noted, on May 31, 1921, he issued Executive
Order No. 3474 without notifying Congress.173
On November 30, 1921, Doheny, a long-time friend of Fall’s, gave a
$100,000 loan to Fall in proximity to the timing of Pan-American’s
acquisition of a lease to drill the Navy’s oil from the two California reserves
in exchange for the construction of fuel storage tanks at Pearl Harbor, and
rights to an oil royalty.174 During World War I, Doheny’s son, Edward
Doheny Jr., served under the command of Captain John Keeler Robison, a
naval officer who became central to the scandal.175 Doheny would later
testify that Robison had encouraged him to consider the oil-leasing and
construction scheme as a secret matter of national security because the
Pacific Ocean would likely be a future theatre of war with Japan.176 Sinclair
likewise insisted that Robison had informed him that the lease had to be
secret, as a matter of national security.177 If true—though Robison would
deny it—this advice was plausible. Since 1907, the United States considered

171. Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 228, 41 Stat. 813 (1920) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 8724.
The exact language of the statute reads:
[T]o conserve, develop, use and operate the same in his discretion, directly or by contract, lease,
or otherwise, and to use, store, exchange, or sell the oil and gas products thereof, and those from
all royalty oil from lands in the naval reserves, for the benefit of the United States.
Id.
172. Id.
173. Exec. Order No. 3474 (May 31, 1921).
174. STRATTON, supra note 18, at 24; On Fall’s and Doheny’s relationship, see LATON
MCCARTNEY, THE TEAPOT DOME SCANDAL: HOW BIG OIL BOUGHT THE HARDING WHITE
HOUSE AND TRIED TO STEAL THE COUNTRY 78–80 (2009). Doheny also contributed $25,000 to
Harding’s election campaign. Id. at 42.
175. MARGARET LESLIE DAVIS, DARK SIDE OF FORTUNE: TRIUMPH AND SCANDAL IN THE
LIFE OF OIL TYCOON EDWARD L. DOHENY 114 (2001); MCCARTNEY, supra note 174, at 94–96.
176. See DAVIS, supra note 175, at 143–44; see also Doheny Declares Robison Said Japan Had Mobilized;
Defends His Loan to Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1926, at 1 (describing the interaction between Robison
and Doheny, from Doheny’s perspective).
177. See DAVIS, supra note 175, at 143–44.
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Japan a potential enemy. By 1921, its naval war plans included a focus on
Japan.178
In regard to the Wyoming Teapot Dome oil component of the scandal,
Fall accepted $198,000 in Liberty Bonds from Sinclair’s corporate officers,
as well as a line of credit to finance one of his New Mexico ranches and
other projects.179 The timing of this transaction, which occurred on
May 10, 1922, was suspect because Sinclair received the no-bid secretive
lease to drill oil fifteen days earlier.180 Fall’s son-in-law also became a part
of transactions with Sinclair over the Teapot Dome oil lease after Fall
tendered $35,000 of the Liberty Bonds to him.181 Moreover, on
November 12, 1922, Sinclair gave Fall’s son-in-law $10,000 in cash while the
two men were at one of Fall’s New Mexico ranches.182 On December 11
of the same year, Fall secretly leased Elk Hills to Doheny.183
On May 10, 1922, National Petroleum News printed an article titled,
“National Producers’ Association Protests Teapot Dome Contract.”184
The National Association of Independent Oil Producers was not concerned
with national security, but rather with the fact that the government had
granted leases to Doheny and Fall without a competitive bidding process.185
There was a greater concern that because of abundant supplies of
commercial oil, and the fact that the oil industry had recently emerged from
an economic slump, the drilling of oil in the naval reserves for further
commercial uses would result in another downturn.186 Moreover, the
article reported there is “no emergency or necessity which would warrant
the opening of the naval [oil] reserves at this time for exploitation in order
that the [N]avy might be supplied with the various grades of oil required by
178. See generally EDWARD S. MILLER, WAR PLAN ORANGE: THE U.S. STRATEGY TO DEFEAT
JAPAN, 1897–1945 (2013) (“U.S. industrial might would be harnessed to a vigorous counteroffensive
to recover lost territories, control the western Pacific, destroy Japan’s military capacity and economic
life, and compel it to complete submission.”); see also Morton, supra note 149, at 222 (“[I]t was not until
Japan’s attack on Russia in February 1904 threatened to destroy the balance of power in that part of
the world that the Board began seriously to develop war plans.”).
179. STRATTON, supra note 18, at 269. Stratton also points out that Fall arranged loans and
credit lines through Sinclair to his son-in-law. Id.
180. SALT CREEK OIL FIELD, supra note 165.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. National Producers’ Association Protests Teapot Dome Contract, NAT’L PETROLEUM NEWS,
May 10, 1922, at 29.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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it . . . .”187 Thus, the association argued in the inverse: no national security
reason could justify the secretive bidding process. Two days later, National
Petroleum News cast doubt on Fall’s claims that oil drainage necessitated
increased drilling.188 But still, the editors doubted whether a congressional
investigation into Fall, Sinclair, and Doheny would “result in anything more
than political thunder.”189
As congressional and public interest in the oil leasing grew in scope, Fall
decided, on March 4, 1923, to resign from the cabinet.190 At Doheny’s
behest, he ventured to the Soviet Union to ascertain whether it would be
possible to drill for oil.191 As he left office, he penned an editorial in the
New York Times in which he underscored that he enjoyed his years of public
service but lamented, “There never was a time when the critic on the outside
looking in found more to criticise than he can find in these days.”192 On
May 26, the Continental Trading Company folded and its officers destroyed
much of the corporation’s records.193 On October 22, the Senate
investigation into the oil leases began.194
The Senate’s action led to President Coolidge appointing Atlee
Pomerene, a former Ohio senator, and Owen Roberts, a future U.S.
Supreme Court justice, to head the investigation.195 As a result of the
Senate passing Joint Resolution 54, on January 31, 1924, one of the initial
duties of Roberts and Pomerene was to void the government’s leases to PanAmerican and Mammoth.196 The two men represented the government in
the civil cases involving the two companies.197 They also obtained grand

187. Id.
188. Lawrence E. Smith, Teapot Dome Development to Be No Factor in Market This Year, NAT’L
PETROLEUM NEWS, May 12, 1922, at 60.
189. Id.
190. STRATTON, supra note 18, at 260.
191. See id. at 270–71; see also Fall Visiting Russia with Oil Operators, WASH. POST, July 4, 1923,
at 13 (reporting on Fall accompanying Sinclair to inspect Russian oil drilling opportunities); Thinks
Soviet’s Rule Will Last: Ex-Senator Fall Declares for Trade Agreement, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1923, at 4.
192. Albert Bacon Fall, Editorial, Secretary Fall’s Soliloquy on Quitting Harding’s Cabinet, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1923, at 1.
193. SALT CREEK OIL FIELD, supra note 166, at 342.
194. Id.
195. Senate, Confirming Pomerene, Votes on Roberts Tomorrow, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1924, at 1
[hereinafter Senate, Confirming Pomerene]; Bates, supra note 22, at 312.
196. Court Action on Oil Leases Will Be Initiated This Week, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1924, at 1
[hereinafter Action on Oil Leases].
197. Senate, Confirming Pomerene, supra note 194; Action on Oil Leases, supra note 196.
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jury indictments against Fall, Doheny, and Sinclair.198 But they did not
argue the challenge to Mally Daugherty’s refusal to testify before the Court.
As the accusations against Fall, Denby, Doheny, and Sinclair took form,
Robison came to Fall’s defense. Robison had served as Chief of the Navy’s
Bureau of Engineering, and in addition to this role, he was placed in charge
of determining the future of the naval oil reserves.199 In December 1923,
Robison began making public statements that the construction of oil tanks
in Hawaii—paid for through the sale of royalty oils—was beneficial to the
national defense.200 But it became problematic when he claimed that the
Navy’s senior officers were supportive of the leases.201 The Atlanta
Constitution, along with other major newspapers, headlined, “Admiral
Robison Declines to Bare Military Secret,” highlighting that he and Denby
had diverged in their testimony before the Senate committee as to whether
the Navy’s senior officers were aware of the planned transfer to the Interior
Department or if Denby had acted alone.202 Other major newspapers
followed suit.203
There were several other problems with Robison’s involvement. In
placing Robison in charge of the leases, Denby unexpectedly replaced three
other officers.204 This would at least give the impression that Denby
believed that some of the Navy’s officers disagreed with giving up control
of the oil reserves to private corporations.205 It was also during the time of
Robison’s testimony that it first came to light that Fall’s financial fortunes
were reported as having markedly improved. On December 1, 1923, the
Atlanta Constitution reported, “Falls Finances Showed Big Spurt.”206
198. SALT CREEK OIL FIELD, supra note 166, at 342 (“June 30, 1924: Grand jury indicts Fall,
Sinclair, E.L. Doheny, and E.L. Doheny, jr. on charges of bribery and conspiracy to defraud
Government.”).
199. Pass Capt. Robison in Navy Promotions, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1925, at 5.
200. Backs Navy Oil Deals: Explains Teapot Dome Lease; Robison Says Contracts for Storage Essential for
the Nation’s Defense, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1923, at 1.
201. Id.
202. Admiral Robison Declines to Bare Military Secret, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 2, 1923, at 9.; Senate
Airs Oil Lease: Dome Field Deal Discussed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1923, at 1.
203. Teapot Dome Lease Detailed in Secret by Admiral Robison: Admiral Insists Hearing in Public Would
Menace Military Plans, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1923, at 2; Denby’s Statement on Teapot Dome is Denied by
Admiral: Robison Says Navy Council Approved Transfer to Interior Department, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1923,
at 3.
204. Daniels’ Policy Cost U.S. Big Oil Loss, Says Doheny, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1924, at 3.
205. See id. (stating Robinson denied that the officers’ removal was related to their “attitude
toward the proposed leases”).
206. Finances of Fall Showed Big Spurt, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 1, 1923, at 16.
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The New York Times, likewise, reported that according to the editor of the
New Mexico State Tribune, as well as state officials, Fall had declared his
financial situation to be dire in 1920, but by 1923, his ranch had been built
up and he had the appearance of having obtained significant wealth.207
Robison’s claim of the need for secrecy might have also struck the
investigators, as well as senior naval officers, as odd. On April 27, 1924, a
naval oil expert publicly testified that the Navy’s ability to confront either
Great Britain or Japan was questionable, partly because of a lack of available
oil and partly because of the lack of defensible naval bases, including in
Hawaii.208 Thus, the very matter Robison wanted to keep secret was
already stated to the public by a former senior naval officer. Moreover, in
1925, Robison contradicted a substantial part of his statements from two
years earlier on the need for secrecy of the leasing. In March 1925, he
conceded in a sworn deposition, taken for the pending civil trial involving
Sinclair’s Mammoth Oil lease at Teapot Dome, that the leasing “was
deliberately concealed from Congress” because they “wanted to get it
done.”209 He admitted he failed to fully inform Congressman Patrick H.
Kelley (R-MI) of the nature of the lease when Kelley specifically asked him
for information.210 But the most shocking admission in his deposition was
that, while he emphasized the Navy’s need for oil in case of a war with Japan,
he conceded no military secrecy reason existed for concealing the leases with
Sinclair.211
A further note on Robison is important to highlight the national security
aspect of the scandal. In October 1925, Coolidge removed Robison from
his Engineer-in-Chief position and replaced him with an officer who had
opposed both the transference of the reserves to the Interior Department
and the leasing.212 Robison was not a political hack, but in retrospect, he
appears malleable. He graduated from the United States Naval Academy in
1891 and held a succession of commands, including one of significance in
207. Witness Says Fall was ‘Broke’ in 1920: New Mexico Editor Asserts Former Secretary’s Ranch Was
Improved Later, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1923, at 15.
208. Navy is Outranked: Expert Critic Says, in Ships, Guns, Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1924, at 1.
209. Say Teapot Lease Guarded Naval Oil; Congress Not Told: Deposition Made by Robison Admits Facts
of Deed Were Concealed, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1925, at 3.
210. Id.
211. Id.; Admiral Robison Defends Oil Lease to Harry Sinclair, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1925, at 3; see
also Robison to Retire; Asks Admiral’s Rank, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1925, at 1 (summarizing Robison’s
military achievements).
212. Halligan Heads Naval Engineers: Coolidge Promotes Opponent of Naval Leasing Policy to Succeed
Robison, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1925, at 1.
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World War I.213 Shortly after Denby became Secretary of the Navy,
Robison was one of two naval officers to travel with him on a tour of naval
bases when Denby was considering concentrating the Navy’s strength in the
Pacific instead of the Atlantic.214 Denby promoted him to the Bureau of
Engineering and to the position of Engineer-in-Chief in October 1921.215
In June 1925, Robison sought Coolidge’s permission to retire from active
duty, but he retired as a Captain instead of as a Rear Admiral because the
Engineer-in-Chief position elevated him to the rank of acting Admiral, and
the President had not approved of his permanent promotion.216 The New
York Times placed Robison’s pending retirement on its front page.217
On March 31, 1924, a grand jury issued an indictment against Sinclair,
charging him with contempt of Congress.218 On June 30, 1924, a
Washington D.C. grand jury issued indictments against Doheny, his son
Edward Doheny Jr., Sinclair, and Fall for “bribery and conspiracy to
defraud” the United States.219 That same day, another Washington D.C.
grand jury issued an indictment against Fall and Sinclair for conspiracy to
defraud the United States, and finally, a grand jury issued an indictment
against Fall for accepting a bribe from Doheny.220 Notably, although Fall
was convicted in a federal criminal trial, a federal jury acquitted Sinclair of
bribery on April 21, 1928.221 However, Sinclair was convicted of contempt
of Congress and sentenced to three months in jail and fined $500.222
Doheny was twice acquitted of wrongdoing.223
Given the open fraud by Fall, Doheny, and Sinclair, the Senate was left
to wonder why the Justice Department had not investigated the men. On
March 1, 1924, the Senate voted to form a committee of five senators to
213. THE U.S. NAVAL ACAD. GRADUATES’ ASS’N: REGISTER OF GRADUATES June 30, 1916,
at 108 (1916).
214. Navy Secretary is Non-Committal: Mr. Denby Refuses to Say Whether U.S. Fleet Will Concentrate in
Pacific and Bases Be Strengthened, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 15, 1921, at 1.
215. Robison Heads Bureau: Navy Captain Becomes Rear Admiral and Chief Engineer, WASH. POST,
Oct. 2, 1921, at 28.
216. Robison to Retire; Asks Admiral’s Rank, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1925, at 1.
217. Id.
218. SALT CREEK OIL FIELD, supra note 166, at 342.
219. Id.
220. Id.; Four Indicted in Oil Leasing, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1924, at 4.
221. Sinclair Acquitted of Oil Lease Fraud; Jury Out 2 Hours, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1928, at 1.
222. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 284 (1929), overruled by United States v. Gaudin,
515 U.S. 506 (1995).
223. SALT CREEK OIL FIELD, supra note 166, at 342; Edward L. Doheny, WAHA,
https://www.westadamsheritage.org/read/472 [https://perma.cc/V4GZ-Z5P3].
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investigate Mally Daugherty.224 “On February 19, 1924, [Senator Burton
K. Wheeler (D-MT)] introduced a resolution” to investigate Daugherty.225
The bipartisan committee consisted of Wheeler, Smith Brookhart (R-IA),
Wesley Livsely Jones (R-WA), Henry Ashurst (D-AZ), and George Moses
(R-NH).226 On March 24, 1924, the investigation issued a subpoena
ordering Daugherty to bring the Midland Bank’s records to the
investigation, but he refused to do so.227 On April 11, Brookhart and
Wheeler journeyed to Ohio and served the subpoena on Daugherty.228 In
response to Daugherty’s continuing refusal, the Senate’s Sergeant at Arms
arrested him.229 Daugherty then filed a suit to enjoin the Senate from
further actions against him.230 Taft’s response to this investigation into his
friend, Daugherty, would prove, as noted in Section III, vitriolic.
III. IN THE LOWER COURTS
Three district court decisions were issued between 1924 and 1925. Mally
Daugherty challenged the Senate’s authority to compel him to testify or
produce bank documents related to transactions involving his brother,
former Attorney General Harry Daugherty, Fall, Doheny, Sinclair, or other
persons involved in the corruption.231 The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio issued a ruling favorable to Daugherty which, had
it remained in effect, permitted the executive branch to shield criminal

224. DAVID PIETRUSZA, JUDGE AND JURY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE KENESAW
MOUNTAIN LANDIS 215 (2001). Taft appears not to have been too concerned with the Senate vote.
On March 5, 1924, he wrote Daugherty to inform him that he intended to designate
Judge Robert Gibson for temporary service in New York. But he made no comment on the Senate
vote. See Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to Harry M. Daugherty, U.S. Attorney Gen.
[hereinafter Daugherty) (Mar. 5, 1924) (on file with the Library of Congress). Ten days later, Daugherty
wrote to Taft that he received notice of another temporary designation of a judge to New York.
See Letter from Daugherty to WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct. (Mar. 15, 1924) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
225. James M. Giglio, Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty and the United Gas Improvement Company
Case, 1914–1924, 46 PA. HIST. 347, 365 (1979).
226. Id.
227. Ex parte Daugherty, 299 F. 620, 622 (S.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d sub nom. McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135 (1927).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 623.
230. Id. at 621.
231. Id. at 622 (ruling Congress did not hold judicial power necessary to compel testimony from
Mally Daugherty).
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conduct from the legislative branch simply by having governmental officers
resign from their positions.232
Regarding oil leases, there were two pathways to the Court. The U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California determined the law did
not permit the leasing to occur, and the leasing between Doheny’s PanAmerican Petroleum Company was procured by fraud.233 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court in all but a minor
part of the decision, barring Doheny from collecting monies from the
government for work already done.234 The U.S. District Court for the
District of Wyoming, in contrast, determined the law permitted the lease
between the government and Sinclair’s Mammoth Oil, and no fraud had
occurred.235 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the
district court on the matter of fraud but agreed with the legal construct
permitting the leases to occur.236 Thus, not only would a split in the circuits
involving Fall and the leases ultimately come to the Court, Harding’s
executive order would be front and center alongside a question of executive
branch authority. Thus, the three decisions stemmed from Taft’s ties to
Daugherty, the Justice Department’s failure to investigate a clear fraud, and
the Department’s incuriosity of the Harding Administration.
A. Mally Daugherty in the Court of Judge Andrew McConnell January Cochran
With the events discussed surrounding Mally Doheny’s involvement with
the controversy and his continuous defiance of the Senate discussed infra.237
On May 1, 1924, Senator Brookhart introduced a resolution seeking
President Coolidge’s permission to appoint Attorney General Harlan Stone
to represent the Senate.238 The apparent intent was to enforce the Senate’s
232. Id.; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 180 (1927) (holding the Senate legitimately
sought Daugherty’s testimony based on its constitutional powers).
233. United States v. Pan-American Petroleum Co., 6 F.2d 43, 65 (S.D. Cal. 1925) (defining a
“natural and irresistible inference of fraud” in the public contracts), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 9 F.2d
761 (9th Cir. 1926), aff’d, 273 U.S. 456 (1927).
234. See Pan-American Petroleum Co. v. United States, 9 F.2d 761, 773 (9th Cir. 1926) (holding
the United States ineligible for equity relief), aff’d sub nom. Pan-Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co. v. United
States, 273 U.S. 456 (1927).
235. See United States v. Mammoth Oil Co., 5 F.2d 330, 350 (D. Wyo. 1925), rev’d, 14 F.2d 705
(8th Cir. 1926) (characterizing the transaction as suspicious but not illegal).
236. See Mammoth Oil Co., 14 F.2d at 730 (acknowledging the evasiveness of witnesses as
indicative of their guilt).
237. See supra notes 216-226 and accompanying text.
238. See Asks Coolidge to Act on Mal Daugherty, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1924, at 1 (reporting Chairman
Brookhart’s resolution to appoint Attorney General Stone to represent the Senate).
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authority in the United States District Court after Mally Daugherty
refused to submit to the committee investigating former
Attorney General Harry Daugherty. The news surrounding both the
former attorney general and his brother turned negative when the district
court took up arguments on the Senate’s authority. Jess Smith’s former wife
testified that at “a little green house in K Street” in Washington D.C.—
a residence where the “Ohio Gang”239 met—the former Attorney General
had sold government jobs and implied that the money went into Mally
Daugherty’s bank.240 She also accused Daugherty of taking payoffs from
bootleggers, and claimed she was threatened by Daugherty’s associates.241
The Senate’s power over Daugherty was not quite a case of first
impression to Judge Cochran. In his view, Daugherty appeared to fall into
a separate category from prior Supreme Court precedent. Four prior
opinions became central to assessing the power of the Senate to compel
Mally Daugherty to testify and provide evidence. In 1818, Speaker of the
House Henry Clay ordered the House Sergeant at Arms Thomas Dunn to
arrest “Colonel” John Anderson for attempting to bribe a member of the
House.242 Dunn did, in fact, arrest Anderson and held him in confinement
for two months, and Anderson sought tort damages from Dunn in turn.243
Despite the lack of unanimity in the House as to whether it had the authority
to adjudge contempt, the House ultimately voted that it did.244 In a very
short opinion authored by Justice William Johnson, the Court determined
in Anderson v. Dunn 245 that although the Constitution was silent on the
legislative branch’s power of contempt, an implied power existed because

239. The term refers to members involved in the Teapot Scandal, including former
President Harding, Daugherty, Fall, and Smith. Ohio Gang, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/topic/Ohio-Gang [https://perma.cc/P6M7-AR4V ]. See generally CHARLES L. MEE, JR., THE OHIO
GANG: THE WORLD OF WARREN G. HARDING (1981), for an in-depth telling of the relationship of
the Ohio Gang members.
240. See Daugherty’s Friend Quoted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1924, at 1 (detailing testimony of
Miss Roxy Stinson implicating Daugherty in accepting deposits from backroom deals).
241. Sees Move to Silence Her, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1924, at 22.
242. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 210–15 (1821); see also PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG,
REPRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
THE LEGACY OF ENGLISH LAW 296 (2010); ALVIN LAROY DUCKETT, JOHN FORSYTH: POLITICAL
TACTICIAN 26 (2010).
243. Dunn, 19 U.S. at 205.
244. BLUMBERG, supra note 242, at 296–97.
245. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821).
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without it, Congress’s other authorities would be thwarted.246
In 1880, the Court unanimously determined in Kilbourn v. Thompson 247
that the House lacked the power to compel a private citizen to testify or
provide evidence when there is no valid legislation being sought in relation
to the testimony.248 Like Dunn, the House Sergeant at Arms arrested
Kilbourn, and he was detained for over a month until securing his release
through a habeas writ.249 Authored by Justice Samuel Miller, Kilbourn arose
as a challenge to an arrest of a citizen similar to what occurred in Dunn, albeit
one in which Hallet Kilbourn had not attempted to interfere in the House’s
legislative business. Kilbourn was a corporate officer of the failed Jay Cooke
& Company Bank, and Congress wanted him to provide evidence as to
where other former bank officials resided to determine the remaining realestate assets of the bank.250
The House’s investigation into Jay Cooke & Company involved the
United States Navy, specifically, the Secretary of the Navy.251 But the
reason the House called Kilbourn did not appear to be directly related to
corruption. Perhaps, Kilbourn conceded if the House had clearly articulated
that his testimony or papers would uncover corruption, he would have no
choice but to comply with a subpoena.252 But then he concluded, “On the
other hand, I cannot acknowledge the naked arbitrary right of the House to
investigate private business, in which nobody but me and my customers
have any concern.”253 Justice Miller’s Kilbourn opinion was also premised
on the fact that, because a judicial remedy existed in the courts to recover
debts owed to it by Jay Cooke & Co., the House exceeded its authority by

246. Id. at 233 (“This argument proves too much; for its direct application would lead to the
annihilation of almost every power of Congress.”).
247. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
248. See id. at 190 (holding that neither the House nor the Senate has the power to compel
testimony from a person unless Congress has jurisdiction over the matter).
249. Id. at 4; see also The Kilbourn Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1876, at 1 (reporting details from
Kilbourn’s indictment).
250. See Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 2–3 (describing purpose of committee to investigate Jay Cooke &
Co.).
251. See id. at 193 (discussing the House’s conduct when investigating misconduct in the Navy
and analyzing the powers of Congress to compel testimony).
252. 44 CONG. REC. 1715 (1876) (citing Letter from Hallet Kilbourn, Corporate Officer,
Jay Cooke & Company Bank, to House of Representatives, Mar. 13, 1876).
253. Id. (quoting same).
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acting as a court instead of suing in the courts.254
Seven years after issuing Kilbourn, the Court decided In re Chapman,255 an
opinion that arose out of a challenge to the Senate’s authority to compel a
private citizen to provide evidence to a legislative investigation.256 In 1894,
Elverton R. Chapman was arrested, prosecuted for contempt, and sentenced
to thirty days in jail after being found guilty in the Supreme Court for the
District of Columbia.257 The Senate formed a committee to discern
whether several senators took bribes from the sugar trust or speculated in
sugar company stocks.”258 Chapman’s arrest was controversial because he
claimed to have proof against one or more of the senators accused in the
bribery scheme but he was frightened from testifying against them.259 He
also asserted as a defense in his 1896 trial that Kilbourn protected him from
being held in contempt.260 Chapman’s appeal to the Court was centered
on whether the District of Columbia’s Supreme Court had jurisdiction to
try him, and if so, whether he was shielded from prosecution because he
was a private citizen like Kilbourn.261 The Court, determined that because
the Senate possessed the authority to investigate the conduct of its own
members, it also possessed the authority to compel testimony related to that
investigation.262 H. Snowden Marshall’s appeal to the Court presented a
unique issue in contrast to the three prior opinions. In Dunn, the private
citizen had attempted to bribe a member; and in Chapman, the private citizen
254. See Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 196 (explaining the limits of congressional power over private
citizens and holding that the House of Representatives exceeded its power by authorizing its
investigation of a private citizen).
255. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
256. Id. at 664.
257. Id.; see Found Guilty of Contempt: Verdict of the Jury in the Witness Chapman Case, WASH. POST,
Jan. 19, 1896, at 4.
258. Chapman to Appear: No Petition for Pardon Has or Will be Filed, WASH. POST, May 13, 1897,
at 1.
259. See id. (describing Chapman’s unwillingness to testify). Senator William Allen (P-NE)
stated:
I look upon Mr. Chapman more as a victim than as a criminal. I saw him once in my life and that
was when he was before our committee for examination. He was very quiet, orderly, [and]
gentlemanly man. He treated the committee with utmost respect, except that he declined
absolutely and unconditionally to answer the questions put to him.
Id.
260. Witnesses Fail to Appear; Prosecution in Broker Chapman's Case Compelled to Close, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 1896, at 9.
261. Chapman, 166 U.S. at 664.
262. Id. at 680.
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had information on Senate corruption. As a result, the two citizens in both
appeals were determined to be subject to Congress’s subpoena authority.
But in Kilbourn, the private citizen was ordered to testify for a non-legislative
reason, and the Court prohibited Congress from using its power to compel
citizens to appear when there was an absence of a “legislative purpose.”
Gordon was also the first time several of the Justices—Holmes, Van
Devanter, McReynolds, and Brandeis—took part in McGrain.
Gordon originated in an appeal by the House Sergeant at Arms Robert
Gordon against the arrest of H. Snowden Marshall, the United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York.263 In late 1915, Marshall
convened a grand jury to investigate German influence in the United States
prior to Congress’s declaration of war on Germany.264 The grand jury
indicted Congressman Frank Buchanan (D-IL) after finding probable cause
of a link between the congressman and a German agent named Franz Von
Rintelen.265 Buchanan responded by introducing articles of impeachment
against Marshall, which were referred to a House committee for
investigation.266 Marshall, in turn, accused the House of interfering in the
grand jury and published the accusation in a newspaper.267 This led to the
Speaker of the House ordering Marshall’s arrest.268 The Court’s opinion,
authored by Chief Justice Edward Douglass White, determined that
263. See Says Strikes Were Bought: Peace Council’ Used by Von Rintelen, District Attorney Declares,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1915, at 1 [hereinafter Says Strikes Were Bought] (discussing the grand jury
investigation of H. Snowden Marshall); see also Funds from Congressmen: Kramer tells How He Understood
Peace Council was Supported, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1915, at 2 [herein after Funds from Congressmen] (noting
Ex-Congressman H. Robert Fowler’s response that claimed Marshall was making a false statement).
264. See Says Strikes Were Bought, supra note 263 (announcing Marshall’s investigation into
Von Rintelen and his associates); see also Funds from Congressmen, supra note 263 (reporting Kramer’s
assertion that Buchanan and Fowler supplied funds for Labor’s National Peace Council).
265. See Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 531 (1917) (indicting Buchanan for a violation of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act as a member of the National Labor Council, an organization allegedly
used as a conduit for German monies intended for espionage activities in the United States); see also
JENNIFER LUFF, COMMONSENSE ANTICOMMUNISM: LABOR AND CIVIL LIBERTIES BETWEEN THE
WORLD WARS 37 (2012) (detailing the origins of Buchanan’s indictment).
266. See Marshall Stood up Against Buchanan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1916, at 10 (reporting
Marshall’s remarks accusing Buchanan of practicing “defen[s]e by impeachment”).
267. See, e.g., Marshall Refuses Buchanan Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1914, at 4 (reporting
Marshall’s accusation that Congress is attempting to obstruct his investigation of
Congressman Buchanan’s German associations) (detailing the conflict between Marshall and the
Congressional Committee investigating him); see also No Apology to House: U.S. Attorney Marshall Stands
Pat on is Buchanan Letter, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1916, at 2 [hereinafter No Apology to House] (detailing
Marshall’s “criticisms of the judiciary subcommittee which investigated Representative Buchanan’s
impeachment charges against him”) .
268. No Apology to House, supra note 267.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

39

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 1, Art. 2

94

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:55

although Marshall’s letter was insulting to the House, the letter did not
interfere with the House’s ability to conduct its legislative duties, and
therefore the power of contempt did not exist.269 Thus, a private citizen
may, while not physically within Congress, denigrate the institution or
individual representatives and be free from the Legislative Branch’s
contempt power.270
On May 31, 1924, Judge Cochran, sitting by special designation in the
Southern District of Ohio, issued a decision unfavorable to the Senate.271
Appointed to the newly created United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky by President William McKinley in 1901, Cochran was
a Harvard Law School graduate and had served as a state trial judge.272 Taft
and Cochran corresponded for more than two decades before Daugherty’s
cause of action against the Senate came to the district court, and it was Taft
who brought Cochran to President William McKinley’s attention as a
judicial nominee. On January 11, Cochran wrote to Taft asking for his
support for a nomination to the district court, noting that Kentucky’s
Republicans almost universally supported him.273 On February 16, 1901,
Taft, then serving as the Governor General of the Philippines, wrote to
McKinley: “A new judicial district is about to be created or has been created
in Kentucky, and I take the liberty of writing you to remind you of the fine
qualifications for that position possessed by A.M.J. Cochran, of Maysville,
Kentucky.”274 McKinley’s nomination of Cochran was met with resistance
269. See Gordon, 243 U.S. at 542 (limiting Congress’s power to punish for contempt to those
cases when its ability to carry out legislative duties is compromised).
270. See id. at 546 (stating that negative criticism alone does not adequately prevent Congress
from discharging its duties to warrant contempt proceedings).
271. See Ex parte Daugherty, 299 F. 620, 632 (S.D. Ohio 1924) (holding that Kilbourn and Gordon
are not controlling on either the Supreme Court or the district courts and that the Attorney General’s
office attempted to impermissibly usurp a judicial function by attempting to coerce testimony), rev’d
sub nom. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
272. See Bradley May Not Get Place, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 28, 1901, at 14 (discussing tight race
for judge position between Cochran and former Governor Kentucky Governor William O’Connell
Bradley); see also Cochran: Appointed Judge of the United States Court District, MESSENGER-INQUIRER,
Apr. 26, 1901, at 5 (announcing President McKinley’s appointment of Judge Cochran); Confirmed by the
Senate: Judge Adams and Mr. Van Cott Among the Nominations Passed Upon, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1901, at 3
(listing various judicial appointments including Cochran and confirming that Judge Cochran was indeed
appointed).
273. Letter from Andrew McConnell January Cochran [herein after Andrew Cochran], St. Trial
Judge, to WHT, Gov. Gen. to Philippines, Jan. 11, 1901 (on file with the Library of Congress).
274. Letter from WHT, Gov. Gen. to Philippines, to William McKinley, U.S. Pres., Feb. 16,
1901 (on file with the Library of Congress). Taft added, “I earnestly urge that Mr. Cochran be
appointed. He is far and away the best man for the place in the Eastern District of Kentucky and
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by Kentucky’s largely Democrat congressional delegation, but Cochran was
able to write Taft on May 21, 1901, that the Senate had voted to confirm
him.275
By March 25, 1924, James Alexander Fowler, who assumed Daugherty’s
duties as assistant attorney general, wrote to Taft suggesting that Cochran
be elevated to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.276 Fowler also
enlisted Sixth Circuit Judge Arthur Carter Dennison to advocate on behalf
of Cochran to Taft.277 Taft responded to Fowler that while he had a high
opinion of Cochran, “Judge Cochran is now a little past [seventy]. His
condition, mental and physical, is 100%; but an appointment at that age is,
according to ordinary standards, likely to be too temporary.”278 Taft also
cautioned Fowler that he ought to ascertain whether Cochran would
consider the elevation to the appellate court a “reward.”279
Cochran began his decision by recognizing that on March 1, the Senate
authorized an investigation into Attorney General Daugherty’s alleged
failure to bring charges against Fall, Sinclair, Doheny, Forbes and others,
along with Daugherty’s apparent inability to adequately protect the interests
of the United States in the oil leases.280 Cochran also noted that Mally
Daugherty had failed to comply with the investigation’s subpoena.281 But,
in reviewing the Senate’s authorization, Cochran noted that in no place did
the Senate articulate that Attorney General Daugherty had committed any
would honor the bench by accepting the pace. He will greatly relieve the [ci]rcuit [j]udges of the heavy
work which they have and will add strength to the judicial timber of the entire circuit.” Id.
275. Letter from Andrew Cochran to WHT, Gov. Gen. to Philippines, May 21, 1901 (on file
with the Library of Congress).
276. See Letter from Arthur C. Denison, 6th Cir. Judge, to WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct,
Mar. 27, 1924 (on file with the Library of Congress) (referencing Fowler’s March 24 letter
recommending Cochran for the position).
277. Letter from Arthur Carter Dennison, 6th Cir. Judge, to WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct,
Mar. 27, 1924 (on file with the Library of Congress).
278. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct, to James Alexander Fowler, Ass’t Attn. Gen.,
Mar. 27, 1924 (on file with the Library of Congress).
279. Id. Taft specifically penned:
Returning again to the subject of Judge Cochran: I believe if I had the appointment to make,
I would find out whether Judge Cochran would really like it; and if he would, and would think of
it as a flattering promotion in the nature of a reward he has so thoroughly earned, that this
consideration would overbalance everything else.
Id.
280. See Ex parte Daugherty, 299 F. 620, 622 (S.D. Ohio 1924) (detailing the charges brought
against Daugherty), rev’d sub nom. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
281. Id.
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crimes, and rather, the investigation was merely premised on the assumption
or possibility that he had done so.282 To Cochran, this meant that the
investigation was personal in nature and not appropriately judicial as within
the Senate’s power.283
Cochran next acknowledged that Dunn permitted the House—and
commensurately the Senate—to arrest and then punish a citizen for
contempt if the citizen refused to obey a lawful legislative command.
However, he interpreted Kilbourn as limiting the Legislative Branch’s power
to arrest and punish to only those governmental areas where a legislative
body had jurisdiction to inquire into.284 That is, Congress could only
investigate matters in which it contemplated legislation. After evaluating the
power of the House, as articulated by the Court in Dunn and Kilbourn,
Cochran considered the subpoena issued against Mally Daugherty to be
“personal” rather than in furtherance of an official function.285 He rested
his reasoning on the fact that Attorney General Daugherty had already
resigned; therefore, the Senate was putting a private citizen on trial as a
proxy to his brother when it did not have the authority to do so.286
Cochran’s decision garnered national media interest. The Washington Post
headlined, “Daugherty Inquiry by Senate Invalid, U.S. Court Decides.”287
A separate Post article informed its readers that Senator Brookhart intended
to seek an immediate appeal to the Court.288 The New York Times front
page reported that Cochran ruled the Senate lacked authority to compel the
testimony of non-governmental persons, even in aid of developing
legislation.289 The Times further reported that in ordering Mally Daugherty
released, Cochran declared the Senate had “usurped [judicial] power and
encroached on the prerogative[s] of the House of Representatives . . . .”290

282. Id. at 623.
283. Id.
284. See id. at 632–36 (providing Cochran’s detailed analysis of relevant precedent) (analyzing
Dunn and Kilbourn as they relate to Daugherty’s situation). Cochran also reviewed Chapman and Gordon;
but concluded that in both of those decisions, the contempt power was exercised against citizens for
misbehaving in front of the Legislative Branch rather than for refusing to comply with an order. Id.
at 631–32.
285. Id. at 623.
286. Id. at 640.
287. Daugherty Inquiry by Senate Invalid, U.S. Court Decides, WASH. POST, June 1, 1924, at 1.
288. Case Will Go to Supreme Court, Brookhart Says, WASH. POST, June 1, 1924, at 2.
289. Frees M. Daugherty on Habeas Corpus, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1924, at 1.
290. Frees M. Daugherty on Habeas Corpus, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1924, at 2.
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B. Pan-American Petroleum: Judge McCormick Shields Robison and Denby
On May 28, 1925, Judge Paul J. McCormick on the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California issued a decision adverse to
Doheny’s two corporations.291 One year earlier, Coolidge appointed
McCormick to the federal bench.292 McCormick believed that he owed his
judicial appointment to Taft, and the two men exchanged
correspondences.293 “I am very glad you are appointed, because, from what
I observe, your appointment has given satisfaction,” Taft wrote.294 “The
eligible list is narrowed much by the penuriousness of the [g]overnment in
the payment of judicial salaries, and the disposition of Senators and
Congressmen to regard the office as nothing but political patronage has
seriously hampered the President in his selections.”295 McCormick,
interestingly, also shared with Taft the Los Angeles Times editors’ opinions on
Doheny and McAdoo referenced in the beginning of this Article.296
After receiving notice of the government’s suit, McCormick appointed
two receivers to oversee Elk Hills and ordered commercial drilling to cease,
except for small amounts that the receivers determined necessary to relieve
pressure on the wells.297 Roberts and Pomerene presented an argument to
the district court that protected Harding’s reputation by asserting that Fall
291. United States v. Pan-Am. Petrol. Co., 6 F.2d 43, 43 (S.D. Cal. 1925), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
and remanded, 9 F2d 761 (9th Cir. 1926), aff’d sub nom. Pan-Am. Petrol. & Transp. Co. v. United States,
273 U.S. 456 (1927).
292. Coolidge Appoints McCormick District Judge of U.S. Court, BULLETIN, Feb. 8, 1924, at 1;
McCormick Takes New Post Today: Leaves Superior Court After Fourteen Years for Federal Bench, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 1924, at 24.
293. Letter from Paul J. McCormick, Judge, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dis. of Cal. [hereinafter
Paul McCormick], to WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct. (Mar. 5, 1924) (on file with the Library of
Congress). McCormick wrote:
It has been represented to me by several mutual friends that during the recent protracted episode
which culminated in my appointment by President Coolidge as Judge of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California, you manifested sympathy with my aspiration and I am,
therefore, desirous of expressing my gratitude for such generous and kindly interest therein.
Id.
294. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct, to Paul J. McCormick, Judge, U.S. Dist. Ct. for
the S. Dis. Of Cal. (Mar. 11, 1924) (on file with the Library of Congress).
295. Id.
296. Letter from Paul J. McCormick, Judge, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dis. of Cal. [hereinafter
Paul McCormick], to WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct. (Mar. 5, 1924).
297. United States v. Pan-Am. Petrol. Co., 6 F.2d 43, 89 (S.D. Cal. 1925) aff’d in part, rev’d in part
and remanded, 9 F2d 761 (9th Cir. 1926), aff’d sub nom. Pan-Am. Petrol. & Transp. Co. v. United States,
273 U.S. 456 (1927).
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had, based on a conspiracy between himself and Doheny, misrepresented to
the President the need to have the oil leases transferred from the
Department of the Navy to the Department of the Interior.298 The proof
of the conspiracy, they insisted, was the $100,000 “loan” made by Doheny
to Fall that accompanied the Pan-American lease.299 As a national security
aspect to the case, during the course of the trial, Secretary of State Charles
Evans Hughes and Secretary of the Navy Curtis Wilbur advised McCormick
that if the court were to divulge certain documents sought by Doheny, it
would be inimical to the “public interest.”300
McCormick determined it was not necessary for the United States to
prove that it suffered a pecuniary loss, but rather that the conspiracy
between Fall and Doheny “defeated” a lawful function of the
government.301 The standard of proof for proving fraud against the
government in a civil case, according to McCormick, was by “clear and
convincing” evidence.302 He then made it clear that Doheny’s claims that
the leases occurred at Denby’s behest, and that Fall had merely served in the
capacity of an agent, were meritless.303 In the middle of his decision, he
noted that at the same time Fall expressed his personal financial woes to
Doheny, the oil lease in California and the naval construction project in

298. See id. at 80–81, 88 (recognizing the fraud and conspiracy of Fall and Doheny); see also
Doheny Is Enjoined: Halts Operation of Navy Lease, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1924, at 1 (reporting the writ of
injunction which restrained “Doheny and associations from further exploitation of their leases . . . .”).
299. Pan-Am. Petrol. Co., 6 F.2d at 53.
300. Cabinet Members Withhold Defense Data in Oil Hearing, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1924, at 1.
301. Pan-Am. Petrol. Co., 6 F.2d at 54 (citing Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 479 (1910)). Haas,
however, was an appeal against the United States Attorney’s decision to prosecute a criminal trial in
Washington D.C., rather than in the defendant’s state of New York. Haas, 216 U.S. at 473 (1910).
302. Pan-Am. Petroleum Co., 6 F.2d at 51. Later in the decision, McCormick held:
The conspiracy alleged in the amended bill, while not charged as a crime, contains the elements
of a criminal conspiracy. This case, however, is a civil action, and not a criminal prosecution.
It is not necessary that the conspiracy be proven to the same degree of certainty as would justify
a conviction of Fall and Doheny, if they were on trial for criminal conspiracy.
Id. at 53. The standard for criminal conspiracy was earlier articulated by the Supreme Court “as a
combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful
purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means . . . .”
Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, as recognized
in Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018). The Court applied this definition to civil appeals
in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 465 (1921).
McCormick, however, did not cite to either of these opinions.
303. Pan-Am. Petroleum Co., 6 F.2d at 61.
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Hawaii were granted to Doheny’s companies.304 In other words, the timing
of the lease and of Doheny’s loan to Fall were more than a coincidence.
McCormick then observed that Robison, more than Denby, bore the Navy
Department’s responsibility for the transfer, and pointed out that Doheny
and Robison had something of a friendly relationship dating to when
Edward Doheny Jr. served directly under Robison’s command.305
McCormack placed significance on congressional authority to nullify a
contract because the lawsuit was brought in compliance with a Senate
resolution which determined that the “leases and contract[s] are against the
public interest.”306 In this respect, his view of congressional authority
differed from Cochran’s. And importantly, as a national security aspect to
his decision, he somewhat exonerated Robison by stating that, “in trying to
strengthen the national defense by utilizing the naval oil reserve, [the
Admiral] was less vigilant than he intended to be.”307 Indeed, McCormick
credited Robison only with taking the lead on “constructing and equipping
reserve fuel oil stations at strategic points” to include Pearl Harbor.308
Although McCormick had pointed out that Robison had a personal
connection to Doheny, he protected the naval officer. This was because his
ruling determined that the construction of oil tanks was wholly a naval
concern; and therefore, a national security policy, while the responsibility or
blame for the actual leasing of oil lands—one McCormick specifically placed
on Fall and Doheny—was for a commercial, rather than naval, purpose.309
Having determined that a fraud against the United States could exist as a
crime even without the loss of money or property, McCormick then
304. Id. at 60–61. McCormick’s observation was telling as to the harm committed to the
United States by Fall and Doheny:
Whatever the $100,000 that was transferred to Secretary Fall by Mr. Doheny, the principal officer
of the defendant corporations, may be called, and regardless of the question whether Mr. Fall
would have obtained it if he had not been Secretary of the Interior of the United States, and at
the time transacting public business as such with Mr. Doheny, the fact is that Secretary Fall did
obtain it when he was Secretary of the Interior of the United States, and a trustee of the public
lands of the United States, and when, as such, he was negotiating with Mr. Doheny concerning
such lands; and the effect of such transaction, in and of itself, constitutes a serious injury and
damage to the beneficiary, the United States of America.
Id. at 55.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. at 56.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.
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concluded his ruling by characterizing the nature of Fall’s and Doheny’s
fraud. He began with the observation that Congress created the
Department of the Navy and possessed the “sole power to provide and
maintain” it.310 He then ruled only the Congress, and not a cabinet officer,
could transfer control of naval oil reserves to another department of the
government.311 In other words, Fall had usurped Congress’s authority and
did so for the $100,000 loan.312 This formed the basis for McCormick to
nullify the lease. However, the government was not wholly victorious.
McCormick also determined that Doheny’s company was entitled to fair
compensation for the construction of the Pearl Harbor oil facilities, as well
as for oil that had already been drilled.313 Perhaps, emblematic of the
decision was a May 29, 1925, Washington Post story which reported that while
Fall “did not make any false representations of fact to President Harding,”
the former Interior Secretary was nonetheless responsible for the fraud
committed to the government.314
C. Mammoth Oil: Judge Kennedy Absolves Fall, Doheny, and Robison
On March 24, 1924, the committee investigating Fall and the oil leases
voted to hold Sinclair in contempt of the Senate and recommended the
Senate certify the issue to the Federal District Attorney to charge him with
the crime of contempt.315 The news for Sinclair grew worse; at the same
time the Teapot Dome lease came before the district court in Wyoming. On
April 1, he was indicted for contempt.316 And then, on July 1, the New York
Times front page read, “Fall, Two Dohenys, and Sinclair Indicted: Ex
Secretary Is Alleged to Have Taken a $100,000 Bribe.”317 By the time
Judge Thomas Blake Kennedy on the United States District Court for the

310. Id. at 87.
311. Id.
312. See id. at 87–88 (“[T]he attempted transfer of such powers from the Secretary of the Navy
renders the contracts and leases void.”).
313. Id. at 88–89.
314. Doheny Oil Leases Void, Court Holds; Appeal Announced, WASH. POST, May 29, 1925, at 1;
see also Harding Exceeded Power: Judge McCormick Finds Transfer of Authority to Fall Unlawful., N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 1925, at 1 (relaying the Court’s conclusion that Secretary Fall’s use of fraud did not influence
the President).
315. Oil Committee Acts to Hold H.F. Sinclair on Contempt Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1924, at 1.
316. Special Counsel Ask Sinclair Indictment: Are Made Assistant District Attorney in Senate’s Contempt
Action., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1924, at 3.
317. Fall, Two Dohenys, and Sinclair Indicted: Ex Secretary is Alleged to Have Taken a $100,000 Bribe,
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1924, at 1.
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District of Wyoming took up the civil case, it appeared that Sinclair had
much to hide and was possibly headed to jail.
On June 19, 1925, Kennedy, however, rejected the government’s
argument to void the lease to Sinclair’s Mammoth Oil Company.318 He
also noted at the end of the decision that the public’s opinion on the matter
was shaped by “sensational” reporting which, by its nature, deprived the
public of the myriad and complex facts as to why the contract with Sinclair
was beneficial to the Navy, and therefore the nation as a whole.319 As a
result, Kennedy, opposite of McCormick, determined that even if Harding’s
executive order was unlawful, it could not form the basis for revoking the
lease with Sinclair.320
Unlike McCormick, Kennedy determined that it was more likely that Fall,
Denby, and Sinclair had acted in good faith, and at worst, were misguided
by an honest, but flawed interpretation of the law.321 This included their
collective determination not to inform Congress of the proposed lease.322
But Kennedy engaged in circular reasoning in concluding that Fall’s and
Denby’s decision not to inform Congress was reasonable because Harding
had already issued an executive order directing the transfer of the oil
reserves.323 In addition to relying on the executive order as justification for
the lease, Kennedy placed weight on the alleged good faith of Robison’s
determination that the private leasing was in the best interests of the Navy

318. United States v. Mammoth Oil Co., 5 F.2d 330, 354 (D. Wyo. 1925), rev’d, 14 F.2d 705
(8th Cir. 1926), aff’d, 275 U.S. 13 (1927).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 45.
321. See id. at 354 (“[W]e do maintain that in the exercise of that power it may be appropriate
legislative authority [to] delegate officers of that department to handle government property in an
unrestricted way and in accordance with a vested discretion.”). Kennedy penned, near the end of the
decision:
The fact that this appears to be a good contract for the government, as testified to by those
witnesses who are qualified to speak of its character, coupled with the fact that the courts should
be concerned in sustaining formal grants upon which the rights and welfare of many may depend,
impels the conclusion that such contracts should not be set aside for light or frivolous reasons,
unless fraud in connection with their execution is clearly shown.
Id.
322. See id. at 346 (explaining the reasoning for secrecy may have been for national security
interests).
323. See id. (“[I]t may be fairly held that they conceived their right to do the things they
purported to do under the Act of June 4, 1920 . . . .”).
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to conclude that nothing illegitimate had occurred in regard to the
transfer.324
Kennedy also considered it important that Denby had relied on the
opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy.325 But he missed an
important point on the nature of a Judge Advocate General’s advice. In Ex
parte Mason, the court determined that the Judge Advocate General’s advice
was not binding on a military department and, arguably in the inverse,
reliance on advice of this nature provides only limited protection from
wrongdoing.326 Had the Navy Judge Advocate General’s legal conclusions
been the reason for Kennedy’s decision to find no fraud occurred, it might
have been a basis to explain differences with McCormick. But Kennedy
evidenced an animus against the government by refusing to grant the United
States a continuance to procure the testimony of H.F. Osler, an attorney and
officer of the Continental Trading Company in Canada.327 Kennedy’s
refusal to grant a delay to Roberts and Pomerene proved problematic
because, on September 24, 1924, the New York Times reported on its front
page that Ontario Supreme Court Justice William Renwick Riddell
threatened Osler with contempt of court for his refusal to testify in the
United States.328 On December 16, the New York Times reported that Osler
tried to appeal against the order to testify.329 On March 12, 1925, the New
York Times noted that Osler became ill while travelling in Egypt and was
being medically treated in London but had nonetheless remained under a
judicial order to testify.330 In the same article, the New York Times reported
that new records of Liberty Bonds had been discovered when investigating
Sinclair’s dealings with Fall.331 Other newspapers carried similar stories on
Canada’s cooperation with the investigation and Osler’s importance.332

324. Id. at 336–39.
325. Id. at 336–37.
326. Ex parte Mason, 256 F. 384, 387 (N.D.N.Y. 1882).
327. Mammoth Oil Co., 5 F.2d at 342.
328. See Canadian Refuses to Testify on Oil: H.S. Osler Faces Jail at Toronto for Contempt on Silence on
Teapot Dome Dealings., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1924, at 9; see also Canadian Cited in Teapot Case, L. A. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 1924, at 3.
329. Osler Files Appeal in Canadian Court: Protests Against Decision That He Must Testify—Text of
Riddell’s Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1924, at 22.
330. New Bonds Traced in Canada Oil Deal; Osler Must Testify: $135,000 in Securities, Resale Profits,
Credited to O’Neil in National City Bank., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1925, at 1.
331. Id.
332. See Osler Appeal Lost in Canadian Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1924, at 6 (expressing a variety
of methods in which Canada cooperated with the investigation); see also Ontario’s Appellate Court Decrees
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Although Kennedy derided the media as “sensational,” prior to issuing his
ruling, it became well known through the national newspapers that Ontario
Supreme Court Justice Riddell called the Continental Trading Company a
“fake,” and that a local judge permitted Osler to journey to Africa for an
unknown period of time on an elephant hunting trip even though there was
an order to testify.333 The New York Times also reported that two other key
witnesses were mysteriously in France, apparently avoiding a prosecution
summons to the trial.334
Kennedy, unlike McCormick, appeared to place some importance on a
shift in the law regarding mining rights.335 That is, he began his decision
with a discussion on how, for most of the region’s history, the Placer Mining
Act enabled a person who discovered minerals or oil on public lands to
“ripen into a right” without the payment of royalties to the United States.336
He intimated that in his view, Taft’s executive order exempting certain lands
from the Act in 1910 was constitutionally questionable, but nonetheless
upheld by the Court in Midwest Oil.337 In the end, Kennedy appeared to
accept that even if the leasing was in violation of the law, the leases had
occurred because the law itself had been a confusing departure from the
traditional treatment of public lands.338
There was a national security implication to Kennedy’s decision. Fall,
along with Denby, argued that one of the key reasons for the secrecy of the
lease, and for the construction of storage tanks at Pearl Harbor, was for
military considerations.339 Kennedy determined the court would not use
the secrecy in the leasing as clear proof of fraud because Roosevelt and
Robison had asked for the lease to remain secret as a matter of national
defense.340 Thus, Kennedy was willing to accept the no-bid contracts, as

Osler Must Answer, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1925, at 3 (explaining the United States’ purpose in seeking
Osler’s testimony).
333. Witness Is Now in Africa: Formed a Trading Company for Sinclair and Paid Profits in Liberty Bonds,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1924, at 1.
334. Id.
335. United States v. Mammoth Oil Co., 5 F.2d 330, 333 (D. Wyo. 1925), rev’d, 14 F.2d 705
(8th Cir. 1926) (citing Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 349 (1919)).
336. Id.
337. Id. at 334.
338. Id. at 333–34.
339. Id. at 336–37.
340. Id. at 346.
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well as the failure to notify Congress, as a legitimate exercise in protecting
the security of the United States.341
D. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Upholds the District Court
McCormick’s ruling was a setback for Doheny, but almost immediately,
as the New York Times reported, Doheny had an avenue to appeal because
Kennedy issued a ruling in Sinclair’s favor and against the government.342
Although there were different defendants and financial tools of fraud in the
two cases—Sinclair’s transference of bonds to Fall and his son-in-law
through a foreign corporation was more sophisticated than Doheny’s loan
to Fall—as a matter of public appearance, it would be difficult for both of
the decisions to simultaneously remain final.
On July 15, 1925, Doheny convinced McCormick to continue the
receivership over the oil reserves while his case was on appeal to the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.343 This was the extent of Doheny’s
success. In a brief decision authored by Judge William Ball Gilbert, with
Judge William Henry Hunt and Judge Frank Rudkin in agreement, the
appellate court upheld McCormick’s ruling against Doheny but also
reversed his determination that the United States would have to compensate
Pan-American for work that had already finished.344 This was because the
court found Doheny culpable in the fraud and not an innocent party to the
oil lease.345 The appellate court pointed out Congress could, as a matter of
the Constitution’s allocation of powers, vote on providing Doheny financial
relief.346 But the district court, having determined that a fraud against the
United States occurred, possessed no authority to bind the United States to
pay compensation to any party involved in the fraud.347
Appointed to the bench by President Benjamin Harrison, Gilbert was

341. Id.
342. Two Decisions Contrary: Sinclair Finding Is Directly Opposite That in the Doheny Case., N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 1925, at 1.
343. Appeals Court Gets Doheny Oil Case: Judge McCormick Grants Defendant Company’s Motion in Elk
Hills Litigation., N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1925, at 3.
344. Pan-Am. Petroleum Co. v. United States, 9 F.2d 761, 768, 773 (9th Cir. 1926), aff’d sub nom.
Pan-Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 456 (1927). The three judges on the
panel were William Henry Hunt, Frank H. Rudkin, and William Ball Gilbert. Id. at 768.
345. Id. at 773.
346. Id. at 771–72.
347. Id. at 771.
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perhaps one of the longest serving judges in the federal judiciary at the time
he authored the decision.348 Taft had been instrumental in Hunt’s
ascension to the appellate court.349 In 1910, Taft appointed Hunt to serve
as a judge on the United States Court of Customs Appeals and to the Ninth
Circuit the following year.350 Prior to that nomination, Hunt served as a
federal district court judge, as governor of Puerto Rico, and as a Montana
territorial legislator, where he took a prominent role in drafting that state’s
first constitution.351 In 1911, Taft appointed Rudkin to the United States
District Court for Eastern Washington, and in January 1923, Harding
appointed Rudkin to the appellate court.352
The Ninth Circuit addressed other matters. For instance, Doheny
objected to statements made during his Senate testimony being used against
Pan-American because he asserted his right against self-incrimination in
court.353 The appellate court responded that Doheny was Pan-American
Petroleum’s principal officer and therefore his statements were admissible
in the district court.354 As a matter underlying the fraud, the appellate court
determined that Denby’s actions exceeded the authority granted by
Congress in the June 4, 1920 Act.355 This was a simple matter to determine
because had the Act enabled the sale of oil, the Navy would have been
required to turn over all proceeds of the sale to the Treasury Department.356

348. DAVID C. FREDERICK, RUGGED JUSTICE: THE NINTH
AND THE AMERICAN WEST, 1891–1941, at 19–20 (Univ. of Cal. Press

CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
ed. 1994). Professor Frederick
notes that “very little is known about Gilbert.” Gilbert was born in 1847 in Fairfax County, Virginia,
and was related to President George Washington. He attended the University of Michigan and then
moved to Oregon, where he was appointed to the bench in 1892. Id.
349. Id. at 124.
350. Id.; GILES S. RICH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND
PATENT APPEALS 28 (1980).
351. FREDERICK, supra note 348, at 124 (labelling Hunt a “high-caliber jurist”); see also
RICH, supra note 350, at 27–28 (summarizing Hunt’s college and professional career). Hunt studied at
Yale and was involved in the drafting of Montana’s state constitution.
In 1900,
President William McKinley appointed Hunt as the First Secretary of the civil government in PuertoRico where he aided in constructing a republican form of government. Id.
352. According to Professor Frederick, Rudkin was adamantly opposed to the use of hearsay
to convict defendants in prohibition trials. FREDERICK, supra note 348, at 159.
353. Pan-Am. Petroleum Co. v. United States, 9 F.2d. 761, 769 (9th Cir. 1926).
354. Id. (“Clearly if any officer of the defendant corporations was authorized to bind them by
declarations after the event, it was Doheny.”).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 770.
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E. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Reverses the District Court
On September 28, 1926, the Eighth Circuit reversed Judge Kennedy’s
decision.357 It is perhaps ironic that William Squire Kenyon, a Harding
appointee, authored the decision.358 Sitting by special designation, William
Alexander Cant, another Harding appointee from the United States District
Court for Minnesota, and Arba Seymour Van Valkenburgh, a Coolidge
appointee from the Eighth Circuit, joined Kenyon.359
The Eighth Circuit’s judges grouped the appeal into a three-question
rubric.360 The first question was whether the lease and supplemental
agreement were made in compliance with law.361 Secondly, the court
sought to address whether both the lease and supplemental agreement were
procured by fraud.362 Finally, the court considered whether Kennedy had
abused his discretion in refusing to grant to the United States a continuance
to procure the testimony of Osler, the Canadian based witness.363
It should be noted that when the Eighth Circuit decided the government’s
appeal from Kennedy’s ruling, Doheny’s appeal from McCormick’s decision
and the Ninth Circuit was pending before the Supreme Court.364 The three
judges recognized the Ninth Circuit’s determination that even if the leasing
contract with Pan-American had not been fraudulently procured, the lease
would have been unlawful for violating the June 4, 1920 Act.365 While the
Eighth Circuit’s judges recognized this decision, they had the opposite
conclusion; the June 4, 1920 Act would have permitted the lease to occur
because Robison represented the Navy in the leasing.366
On the matter of fraud, the court began its decision with the admonition
that the crime of fraud could not be presumed on inferential evidence, even
though people involved in a criminal conspiracy rarely publish their
plans.367 But, having articulated this point, the court then concluded the
evidence available to Kennedy more than substantiated the existence of a
357.
13 (1927).
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

United States v. Mammoth Oil Co., 14 F.2d 705, 705, 733 (8th Cir. 1925), aff’d, 275 U.S.
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 716.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 717.
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conspiracy to commit fraud.368 Regarding Fall’s conduct, the judges
determined “there was an utter lack of faith in the matter.”369 They also
took aim at Sinclair in finding that, because the Mammoth Oil lease was
procured through fraud, Sinclair’s company was a trespasser on federal land
rather than a corporation doing business with the government.370
IV. AT THE SUPREME COURT
On December 5, 1924, George Wickersham, along with
Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone, and his assistant, William T.
Chantland, argued to the Court that each house of Congress possessed an
independent power to investigate matters affecting the United States.371 By
the time Wickersham argued, he was nationally known as a distinguished
lawyer having served as attorney general in Taft’s administration.372
Although it might seem odd that three executive branch attorneys argued
the matter to the Court, this occurred in response to a Senate resolution.373
Wickersham concluded his argument with the rhetorical question:
Can it possibly be said that the discovery of any facts showing the neglect or
failure of the Attorney General or his assistants properly to discharge the
duties imposed upon them by law cannot be and would not naturally be used
by Congress as the basis for new legislation safeguarding the interests of the
[g]overnment and making more improbable in the future the commission of
any illegal or improper acts which might be shown to have been committed
in the past?374

The importance of the appeal to the legislative branch against Cochran’s
decision perhaps may be best ascertained by how the Senate treated it. On
June 5, 1924, the Senate, by a vote of seventy to two, determined to appeal
Cochran’s decision to the Court.375 The Senate’s vote is understandable
368. Id.
369. Id. at 720.
370. Id. at 733.
371. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 137, 164 (1927).
372. See Rayman L. Solomon, The Politics of Appointment and the Federal Courts’ Role in Regulating
America: U.S. Courts of Appeals Judgeships from T.R. to F.D.R., 9 AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH. J. 285, 327–30
(1984) (summarizing Taft’s relationship with Wickersham).
373. Stone Prepares Fight on Daugherty, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1924, at 3.
374. See McGrain, 273 U.S. at 144 (detailing the contents of the brief for appellant).
375. Phillip Kinsley, High Court to Define Powers of the Senate: Daugherty Issue Will be Taken to Supreme
Tribunal for Ruling, SIOUX CITY J., June 6, 1924, at 1. Two senators, George Wharton Pepper (R-PA)
and Seldon Spencer (R-MO) voted against the appeal, but the vote itself was both overwhelming and
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because, if Cochran’s decision were permitted to become the law of the land,
it would allow a president to shield the executive branch from misconduct
investigations simply by dismissing officials. Despite the Senate’s objection,
Cochran was confident his decision would be upheld. In early 1926, he
wrote to Taft that “the oil development, out of which grew a great number
of suits involving constructions of leases and settlements of boundary lines
is largely a thing of the past.”376
The Senate vote likely placed Taft in an odd position because of
connections to Daugherty, coupled with his desires to keep Harding’s legacy
untainted and keep Coolidge in the White House. When the Court took up
the appeal, Taft assigned Justice Willis Van Devanter to write the
unanimous opinion.377 According to the docket book maintained by
Justice Pierce Butler, in conference, Justice Louis Brandeis intended to
dissent, but did not do so.378 His brief draft dissent argued that the appeal
had become moot and implied that the Sixty-Ninth Congress would have to
reissue the subpoena because the Congress which issued the subpoena, the
Sixty-Eighth Congress, was no longer in session.379 Taft appointed Van
Devanter to the Court in 1910 after Van Devanter served the Eighth Circuit
for seven years.380 Van Devanter has been characterized as a “failure” and
a slow writer of opinions.381 One biographer commented that, in addition
to Taft placing Van Devanter on the Court, the two men “shared views on
virtually all legal and political issues.”382 Another biographical sketch on
Van Devanter characterized him as being “one of the [least] productive
bipartisan in disagreeing with the limitations placed on Congress by Cochran. Senator Frank Bartlett
Willis (R-OH) voted in favor of appealing, but he insisted that Cochran’s ruling was a correct
constitutional law statement.
376. Letter from Andrew Cochran, Judge, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of KE, to WHT, C.J.
of the U.S. Sup. Ct. (Dec. 4, 1926) (on file with the Library of Congress).
377. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to HT (Jan. 17, 1924) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
378. Barry Cushman, Inside the Taft Court: Lessons from the Docket Books, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 345,
348 (2016).
379. Louis Brandeis, Memorandum on McGrain v. Daugherty (Aug. 11, 1926) (on file with
author).
380. M. Paul Holsinger, The Appointment of Supreme Court Justice Van Devanter: A Study of Political
Preferment, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 324, 329 (1968).
381. See Robert W. Langran, Why Are Some Supreme Court Justices Rated as “Failures?”, in
YEARBOOK 1985: SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY 8–9 (1985) (characterizing Van Devanter
as a “failure” and a slow writer). But see WALTER F. PRATT, JR., THE SUPREME COURT UNDER
EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE, 1910-1921, at 22 (1999) (noting Taft “could have hardly avoided
Van Devanter’s appointment to the Court.”).
382. RENSTROM, supra note 59, at 54.
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justices” during his judicial tenure.383 Van Devanter attended the
Cincinnati Law School, the same law school as Taft, but ventured to the
Wyoming Territory where he rose to chief justice of the territorial court, a
state legislator, and then as an assistant attorney general under McKinley.384
There is one final note on Van Devanter worthy of mention in discussing
judicial ethics: He recused himself from the appeals involving Sinclair and
Doheny.
The timing between the arguments and the issuance of the two opinions
in the civil leasing cases were much quicker than in McGrain. The Senate’s
appeal from Cochran’s decision, after all, had languished at the Court
without an intermediate court of appeals review for more than two years.
On October 5 and 6, 1926, Pomerene and Roberts argued Pan-American
Petroleum and the Court issued its opinion on February 28, 1927. On
April 12 and 13, 1927, Pomerene and Roberts argued Mammoth Oil and the
Court issued its opinion before the end of that year. During the first part
of the year, Coolidge made it publicly known that he intended to begin new
warship construction in the category of “cruisers.”385 Coolidge also,
however, sought a new naval limitations treaty, and Taft was aware of both
policies.
In early 1927, Taft indicated his disgust with the Democrats’ opposition
to Coolidge’s plans to construct a larger Navy: “Congress is in an active
session and the Democrats are lining up in every possible way to embarrass
the President, and even the Regulars have thought it necessary to differ with
him on the subject of a larger Navy, but with the aid of Burton in the House,
the President beat them by nearly twenty votes, and I am not sure what he
will do in the Senate.”386 However, Taft apparently was unaware that
Coolidge also sought naval reductions as a matter of international
agreement.387 Specifically, in early February 1927 Coolidge asked for the
“Big Five” governments—Britain, France, Japan, Italy, and the United
383. REBECCA S. SHOEMAKER, THE WHITE COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 78
(2004).
384. PRATT, supra note 381, at 22–23.
385. B.J.C. McKercher, “A Certain Irritation”: The White House, the State Department, and the Desire
for a Naval Settlement with Great Britain, 1927–1930, 31 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 829, 840 (2007).
386. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to CT, (Jan. 9, 1927) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
387. See, e.g., Tadishi Kuramatsu, The Geneva Naval Conference of 1927: The British Preparation
for the Conference, December 1926 to June 1927, 19 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 104, 104 (1996) (stating
President Coolidge sent an invitation to the signatory nations to negotiate an agreement limiting certain
classes of naval vessels).
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States—to meet in Geneva to extend the Washington Naval Treaty’s ratiobased limitations to smaller naval vessels.388
Although the Geneva conference attendees would not meet until after
the issuance of Pan-American Petroleum—and before McGrain and Mammoth—
Coolidge’s actions highlight that the Court would give the three opinions
when the major global powers were pursuing a means of maintaining
peace.389 In the month prior to the issuance of Pan-American Petroleum, the
news media presented an image to the public that Japanese military power
was seen as less of a threat and more of a matter controllable by international
law. On February 18, the New York Times reported on its fourth page that
the Japanese government favorably viewed further naval arms limitations
set by treaty.390 Two days later, The Washington Post reported that Japan’s
government had been more cooperative than the French in working toward
new naval arms limitations.391 Coolidge’s efforts at naval reductions
ultimately ended in failure because of obstruction from the governments of
Britain, France, and Italy, rather than from the Japanese government.392
A. Taft’s Ethics: Activities, Opinions, and the Senate Investigation
Harry Daugherty is remembered today as an Ohio lawyer who
represented Harding in “a smoked filled room” at the 1920 Republican
Convention in Chicago’s Blackstone Hotel.393 Daugherty is also
remembered of course for being one of the more corrupt, if not unqualified,
attorney generals in United States history.394 He was a political operator in
388. DUDLEY KNOX, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 428 (1948); David Carlton,
Great Britain and the Coolidge Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927, 83 POL. SCI. Q. 573, 573–74 (1968).
389. See FANNING, supra note 123, at 19. Fanning notes that “a peace psychology” had taken
root in the United States. Carlton, supra note 387, at 573–74, 598.
390. Japan’s Arms Reply Will Affect Amity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1927, at 4.
391. Japan Acceptance of Navy Arms Plan May Result in Pact, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1927, at M4.
The Post also reported that Benito Mussolini was opposed to Italy signing a new agreement as a result
of the French government’s reticence to do so.
392. McKercher, supra note 385, at 831; Norman Gibbs, The Naval Conferences of the Interwar Years:
A Study in Anglo-American Relations, 30 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 50, 53(1977).
393. For a consistent view of Daugherty over time, see JOE MITCHELL CHAPPLE, LIFE AND
TIMES OF WARREN G. HARDING: OUR AFTER WAR PRESIDENT 135 (1924); Wesley M. Bagby,
The “Smoked Filled Room” and the Nomination of Warren G. Harding, 41 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 657,
659–660 (1955); and JOHN DEAN, WARREN G. HARDING: THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS SERIES:
THE 29TH PRESIDENT, 1921–1923, at 56 (2004). John Dean, who served as White House counsel
under Nixon was later convicted for crimes arising from the Watergate scandal. See, e.g., John W. Dean
& James Robenalt, The Legacy of Watergate, 38 LITIGATION 19, 24 (2012).
394. See Giglio, supra note 223, at 347; STRATTON, supra note 18, at 108, 332; WILLIAM ALLEN
WHITE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 620 (1946).
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Ohio who earned a law degree from the University of Michigan in 1881 and
then aligned with Republican icons, including Senators Joseph Foraker and
Mark Hanna, Governor William McKinley, and of course, Harding.395 Less
understood about Daugherty is that, before his allegiance to Harding, he
contributed to Taft’s rise to presidency.396 Prior to the 1908 election, Taft
apparently felt strongly enough about Daugherty to ascertain whether he
should become the chairman of the Republican National Committee.397
On June 8, 1908 Taft expressed his “delight” that Daugherty would attend
the nominating convention “in order to straighten [out] the cause.”398
Moreover, in 1912, Daugherty campaigned for Taft’s reelection against
Wilson, Roosevelt, and Debs.399 Indeed, when a number of Ohio’s
Republican legislators appeared to lean toward supporting Roosevelt,
Daugherty worked hard to make sure Taft did not lose Ohio and Taft
expressed his gratitude for Daugherty’s efforts.400 After Taft became Chief
Justice, he and Daugherty worked with Harding to shape the president’s
national message on whether a “war bonus” should be paid to World War I
veterans.401 Taft did not view Daugherty as corrupt, but instead considered
him to be a Republican loyalist. His opinion on Daugherty would be slow
to change, and indeed, his letters to his children and friends evidence a desire
to not only protect Harding’s reputation, but also, until McGrain’s issuance,
Daugherty.
Taft had a different opinion of Fall and Denby than he did about
Daugherty. The chief justice considered Fall dishonest and Denby a wellmeaning, but gullible dolt. In January 1924, Taft informed his son Robert
that he was not surprised Fall had brought Denby and the Harding
395. Giglio, supra note 225, at 361–62.
396. GIGLIO, supra note 162, at 33–34.
397. See Letter from Harry Daugherty to WHT, Sec. of War (June 2, 1908) (on file with the
Library of Congress) (suggesting Taft nominate Jacob Vorys for the position instead).
398. Letter from WHT, Sec. of War, to Harry Daugherty (June 5, 1908) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
399. GIGLIO, supra note 162, at 59.
400. Letter from WHT, Pres. of U.S., to Harry Daugherty (June 6, 1912) (on file with the
Library of Congress). Taft ended the letter,
“We must not overlook the sentimental value of having controlled it, and I appreciate all that you
did. I note all that you say in your letter, and am confident we shall be successful at Chicago.
It is a real fight, but so long as we approach it in that spirit we need not fear the result.”
Id.
401. The Role of Chief Justice William Howard Taft as a Presidential Advisor, 13, in NOMINATION OF
ABE FORTAS, UNITED STATES SENATE, Sep. 20, 1968, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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administration into disrepute.402 “I have no idea that Denby was
dishonest—I never thought that,” Taft claimed, “Denby ought not to have
been taken into the cabinet, because he is not a big enough man.”403 In
spite of Taft’s disdain for Fall, he was highly critical of the witnesses brought
in to testify about the former Interior Secretary’s conduct. “The oil mill
scandal has been suspended for ten days,” Taft wrote, “Vanderlip’s effort
was enough to end anything.”404 The name “Vanderlip” referred to Frank
Vanderlip, a banker and financier who intimated that Harding knew of Fall’s
corruption as it was occurring.405 In 1917, Vanderlip was placed in charge
of a committee to promote Liberty Bonds and he had sought Taft’s support
in advertising the importance of the program.406 Taft also added his disdain
for the Denver Post, adding, “I don’t know whether you have followed the
evidence, but the fraud of the newspapers of Denver is about equal to the
fraud of Fall.”407 Taft’s disgust with the Denver Post originated when
Senator Thomas Walsh (D-MT), one of the committee’s members,
discovered with the help of a Denver Post’s editor, that Fall’s financial
situation after meeting with Sinclair and Doheny had remarkably improved
after the leases were granted.408
Perhaps the most outstanding feature of Taft’s letters to his sons about
the investigation into Fall is that he actually conferred with Coolidge on the
appointment of the investigators. On February 3, 1924, he penned to
Charles, “They have employed Pomerene, and I think he is a very good man.
I recommended Percy of Alabama. The President telephoned me to ask
about [former Attorney General] Gregory whom Hughes and McReynolds

402. See Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to RT (Jan. 27, 1924) (on file with the
Library of Congress) (disagreeing with Senator Cummins’s opinion of Fall’s good character).
403. Id.
404. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to CT (Feb. 17, 1924) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
405. See Harding’s Friends Aroused: Rumors of Profiting in High Places Stir Washington, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 1924, at 1; Vanderlip Admits Only Hearing Gossip: But he Questions Reported Payment of $550,000
for Marion Newspaper, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1924, at 1; Vanderlip’s Testimony Evokes Pointed Comment by
Editors, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1924, at 2.
406. Letter from Frank Vanderlip, banker and financier, to WHT (May 16, 1917) (on file with
the Library of Congress).
407. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to CT (Feb. 17, 1924) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
408. J. LEONARD BATES, SENATOR THOMAS J. WALSH OF MONTANA: LAW AND PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, FROM TR TO FDR 217–220 (1999).
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had recommended to him.”409 Thus, in this letter, Taft implicated
Justice James C. McReynolds as having also met with Coolidge to
recommend investigators.410 Like Taft, McReynolds would not recuse
himself from any of the appeals.
On February 25, 1924, six days after Wheeler introduced the resolution
to investigate Daugherty, Taft wrote to Robert that “politics continued to
be sensational” partly because of “Bolshevik” influences that had arrayed
against Daugherty.411 He was convinced that Wheeler and Brookhart had
created a committee specifically to embarrass and convict Daugherty before
an investigation commenced.412 He also called Henry Cabot Lodge (RMA), William Borah (R-ID), and George Pepper (R-PA) cowards for not
defending Daugherty.413 Thus, from the start, Taft not only believed in
Daugherty’s innocence and Fall’s malfeasance, he also was angry with at
least five Senate Republicans and, over time, his anger did not abate.
In mid-March Taft wrote to Charles, “the vicious piffle, as characterized
by Secretary [of the Treasury] Mellon, continues in the attack on
Daugherty.”414 He went on to disparage the investigation, calling the
senators “really crazy to delve into all sorts of rottenness,” and accusing
them of basing their conclusions of Daugherty’s malfeasance on “the most
disrespectful witnesses.”415 He singled out the fact that Senator Ashurst
had relied on Gaston Means, a discredited bootlegger and con artist, to
publicize the Harding administration’s connection to criminals.416
However dubious Means’ past was, at one time he worked as an agent for
the Justice Department and one of Daugherty’s associates, Jess Smith,
supervised him.417
409. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to CT (Feb. 3, 1924) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
410. Id. Taft also added, “It is quite possible that we shall have the Fall business before us very
quickly if he refuses to testify before the Senate Committee and they attempt to compel him by
imprisoning him. A writ of habeas corpus could be brought pretty promptly up to us and we may have
it.” Id.
411. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to RT (Feb. 24, 1924) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to CT (Mar. 16, 1924) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. WILLIAM A. COOK, KING OF THE BOOTLEGGERS: A BIOGRAPHY OF GEORGE REMUS
44 (2008).
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Another example of Taft’s questionable conduct is evidenced in a late
March letter to Max Pam, an attorney he was acquainted with. On
March 30, Taft gave legal advice to Max Pam, the general counsel of the
American Steel and Wire Company, on his relationship to Daugherty and
the possibility that the Senate might call him to testify.418 One day earlier,
the New York Times published accusations that Daugherty had promised
federal judgeships in exchange for thousands of dollars, and Pam was
concerned that if he ventured to Europe, the investigation would consider
him complicit in Daugherty’s corruption.419 Although Pam was named in
the article, Taft advised him to continue with his planned trip to Europe.420
The same day he advised Pam to proceed with travelling to Europe, Taft
informed Robert that Coolidge had no choice but to push for Daugherty’s
resignation, even though Daugherty was innocent.421 To his brother
Horace, Taft penned, “Daugherty has come out with a manly statement in
respect to Coolidge, and after the evidence with respect to him has been
digested, all it will disclose, so far as he is concerned, is that he had some
very undesirable associates.”422
Taft continued to denigrate the Senate’s investigation into Daugherty in
April. On April 20, Taft penned to Charles, “The Democrats have
overplayed their hand in the foolish evidence that they have been continuing
to introduce by convicts and persons utterly lacking in their credibility.
Walsh is wildly attempting to implicate the Republican Party in 1920 in an
effort to steal oil lands from the government for the oil kings, while Wheeler
is occupying himself in ghost stories with reference to a lot of things that
have lost interest because Daugherty is out of office.”423 Earlier, Charles
had cautioned Taft that while Daugherty’s resignation should have ended
418. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to Max Pam, Gen. Counsel, Am. Steel and
Wire Company [herein after Max Pam] (Mar. 30, 1924) (on file with the Library of Congress);
see William T. Hart, An Admired Colleague in the Practice of Law, 62 WASH. L. REV. 619, 619 (1987)
(regarding Pam).
419. Judgeship for Sale, Olcott Was Told; Appointment Priced to Him at $35,000, New York Lawyer Tells
Daugherty Committee, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1924, at 1; Letter from Max Pam, to William Howard Taft,
WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct. (Mar. 29, 1924) (on file with the Library of Congress).
420. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to Max Pam (Mar. 30, 1924) (on file with the
Library of Congress).
421. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to RT (Mar. 30, 1924) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
422. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to HT (Apr. 2, 1924) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
423. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to CT (Apr. 20, 1924) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
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the investigation, the former attorney general was unpopular in Southern
Ohio.424 To his son, Robert, he penned, “The Democrats love
investigations so much that they are quite disposed to go on no matter how
the [g]overnment suffers.”425 He added that he had sought out Walsh to
ascertain how long the investigation might continue so that he could plan
for an appeal on the subject of the Senate’s right to question witnesses.426
Taft however, had an unrealistic opinion on Daugherty. While it was true
that on May 31, Judge Cochran issued his ruling favorable to Mally
Daugherty, this did not end the Senate’s pursuit of the investigation and, as
earlier noted, the Senate voted to appeal the decision. A new attack by
Harding’s supporters against the investigation was a close reprise of the facts
Just as the House had turned on
in Marshall v. Gordon.427
U.S. Attorney H. Snowden Marshall in 1915, Harding’s and Daugherty’s
allies—particularly an individual named Blair Coan—turned on Wheeler,
accusing him of ties to communism.428 The Justice Department pursued
Wheeler on a different matter, however. The United States Attorney
presented evidence to a federal grand jury that Wheeler—an attorney prior
to his Senate tenure—represented a client before a federal agency.429 And
on May 16, the New York Times reported that Thomas Miller, the Alien
Property
Custodian,
had
complained
to
Harding
about
Attorney General Daugherty and Jess Smith pressuring him to deposit
government funds into Midland National Bank.430
On November 4, 1924, when Americans cast their votes for president,
they overwhelmingly supported Coolidge’s reelection over that of John W.
Davis, a conservative Democrat, Robert La Follette, and ironically, Wheeler,
who were partnered under the Progressive Party banner.431 Perhaps
because Coolidge had acted to appoint Roberts and Pomerene to investigate
424. Letter from CT, to WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct. (Apr. 2, 1924) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
425. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to RT (Apr. 13, 1924) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
426. Id.
427. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).
428. RICHARD GID POWERS, NOT WITHOUT HONOR: THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN
ANTICOMMUNISM 71–73 (1998).
429. Id. at 71 (1998).
430. Daugherty Friends Angered Col. Miller, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1924, at 21.
431. DAVID JOSEPH GOLDBERG, DISCONTENTED AMERICA: THE UNITED STATES IN THE
1920s 61–65 (1990); see WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER’S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS
222 (1990) (noting by the time of the election, “an aura of granite-like integrity had settled in on Calvin
Coolidge”).
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corruption, a majority of the electorate did not hold him responsible for the
scandal.432 Davis’s biographer has noted that the scandal also affected the
Democrats in the election because one of the early leading presidential
aspirants, McAdoo, had received $150,000 from Doheny, and Davis had
long-standing ties to billionaire J.P. Morgan.433 In early December, Taft
reflected on the election and Daugherty in a letter to Charles D. Hilles, a
fellow Ohioan and one time chair of the Republican National Party, that
political patronage had brought about the ruin of the Justice Department.
“I am sorry to say that Daugherty’s office was filled with people who were
not competent, due to unyielding to this very method,” Taft lamented.434
Coolidge’s reelection did not cause Taft to cease disparaging the
investigations. In late November 1924, Taft had not merely soured on
Walsh, to his son Robert he poured invective on the legislator by calling him
“the narrowest man in the Senate.”435 In January 1925, Taft told Robert
that he had spoken with Attorney General Stone about the case against
Wheeler and then added, “Wheeler is a vicious man, a man irresponsible,
and with a very bad reputation in Montana.”436 Wheeler would be rapidly
acquitted in what became considered a sham trial, but if he had been
convicted and appealed to the Court, one might well wonder whether Taft
would have recused himself.437 Recusal might have become an open
argument as Walsh had defended Wheeler.438
Taft added that Borah had interfered with the Justice Department with
“utter inconsistency” and “in an unconstitutional way.”439 Borah had
supported both Harding and Coolidge, but was known as a “liberal”
Republican, and had been one of four senators to oppose Taft’s nomination
to the Court.440 In early February 1925, Taft penned his opinions on
432. Bates, supra note 22, at 309–314.
433. HARBAUGH, supra note 431, at 197.
434. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to Charles D. Hilles, Former Chair, Republican
National Party (Dec. 5, 1924) (on file with the Library of Congress).
435. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to RT (Nov. 30, 1924) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
436. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to RT (Jan. 25, 1925) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
437. Court Throws Out Wheeler Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1925, at 1.
438. Id.
439. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to RT (Jan. 25, 1925) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
440. GOULD, supra note 5, at 170–71; see Darrell LeRoy Ashby, William E. Borah and the Politics
of Constitutionalism, 58 PAC. NW. Q. 119, 121–23 (1967) (pointing out Borah was both pro Prohibition
and pro wanting the party to not oppose southern segregationist laws); Robert James Maddox,
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Wheeler to Robert once more, this time chastising the Senate for permitting
the Senator to cross examine Stone while at the same time the Justice
Department had secured an indictment against him.441 Taft had a high
opinion of Stone, and was happy to see that Coolidge nominated him to the
Court, but he did not relish that Borah, Walsh, and Wheeler would get to
question him in the midst of Wheeler’s criminal trial.442
Taft’s extrajudicial activities, including some that would have related to
the three pending opinions, continued through 1925. In January, he advised
Coolidge against appointing Charles Beecher Warren to serve as Stone’s
successor as attorney general.443 “I don’t think so highly of the selection
of Charles Warren of Michigan for Attorney General,” Taft wrote to his
son. “He has quite enough capacity to fill the office well, but I am not so
confident of his sturdy honesty and hewing to the line.”444 Taft added in
his letter that Secretary of State Hughes was soon to depart, and Coolidge
intended on nominating Senator Frank Kellogg to take his place. “I don’t
think this adds much to the strength of the cabinet,” Taft penned.445
“Kellogg is a hard worker but isn’t a man of force or courage. He is shifty,
just as Warren is.”446
The 1926 midterm elections resulted in the Republican Party losing nine
seats in the House of Representatives but still maintaining a majority of 238
seats to the Democratic Party’s 194.447 The Democratic Party picked up
eleven seats, while the third party Farmer-Laborer—a Minnesota Party—
William E. Borah and the Crusade to Outlaw War, 29 HISTORIAN 200, 200–201 (1967) (noting Borah
sought to outlaw war but opposed the United States becoming a part of a binding world organization
to do so).
441. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to RT (Feb. 1, 1925) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
442. Id.; Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to RT (Jan. 11, 1925) (on file with the
Library of Congress).
443. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to RT (Jan. 11, 1925) (on file with the Library
of Congress); see Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to RT (Feb. 3, 1925) (on file with the
Library of Congress) (stating he was happy Stone’s nomination to the Court succeeded despite Walsh’s
pushback).
444. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to RT (Jan. 11, 1925) (on file with the Library
of Congress). The Senate twice rejected Charles B. Warren, in part based off his close ties to the “Sugar
Trust” which had been accused of unlawfully monopolizing sugar to the point of manipulating prices.
JOSEPH PRATT HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 260 (1953).
445. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to RT (Jan. 11, 1925) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
446. Id.; HARRIS, supra note 444, at 260.
447. MICHAEL J. DUBIN, UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, 1788–1997:
THE OFFICIAL RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS OF THE 1ST THROUGH 105TH CONGRESSES 468 (1998).
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lost one of their two seats and the Socialist Party maintained one seat.448
Likewise, in the Senate, the Republican Party lost seven seats to the
Democratic Party but maintained their majority of forty-nine to forty-six
seats.449 One of the Republican losses in the Senate, that of James
Wadsworth (R-NY), was particularly troubling to Taft (as he described to
Elihu Root on the eve of the 1926 midterm congressional election) that “it
would be a great loss to the Senate if Wadsworth is not elected . . . .”450
Taft’s letter to Root may be the most consequential of all his letters in
evidencing his mindset on Daugherty and Harding. “I have been following
with a great deal of interest the trial of the indictment of Harry Daugherty
and Miller, the Alien Property Custodian,” Taft penned. “I don’t know how
much dirty linen of the Republican Party is going to be exposed on the wash
lines.”451 He then added that if the trial court in the Alien Custodian
charges against Daugherty followed the rules of evidence, there was a chance
for Harding’s legacy to survive.452 Taft stated that he had known Harding,
as a fellow Ohioan “for a good many years,” and considered him “a man of
fine address, very handsome in his bearing and appearance,” and a hard
worker.453 But, he also recognized that Harding “did not object to hard
liquor, and he loved poker and speculation . . . .” To this end, Taft
speculated that had Harding given up his carousing once he became
president, he would have lived until the end of his term.454 Perhaps in an
anthem to Harding’s presidency, Taft concluded on Harding, “[H]e did not
observe the caution that most Presidents have (and it is a good thing for
them to have) of living a life wholly free from the practice of habits that if
disclosed would shock the sense of propriety of the great body of the
people.”455
To Taft, Daugherty was a “a man of personal honesty,” but had made
enemies as a result of his ambition “to achieve a standing in the higher rank

448. Id.
449. Id. at 468–69.
450. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to Elihu Root (Sep. 17, 1926) (on file with the
Library of Congress). In this same letter, Taft also asked Root to lobby President Coolidge to appoint
August Hand, then a judge on the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id.
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of the profession.”456 Although Daugherty had surrounded himself with
corrupt men such as Jess Smith and John King, Taft insisted that
Daugherty’s faults were only in his efforts to “suppress evidence that might
reflect in some way on Harding . . . .”457 In other words, Taft refused to
believe that Daugherty had engaged in corruption for the purpose of selfenrichment, but only out of a sense of loyalty to Harding’s memory and the
Republican Party. And Taft appreciated that Daugherty “did more good
work in preventing the politicians from putting in bad District and Circuit
Judges than any recent [a]attorney [g]eneral.”458 But, while Taft conceded
that Daugherty was a poor judge of character, the enemy of the government
remained not its corruptors, but Daugherty’s opponents, like Wheeler and
Walsh.459
B. McGrain v. Daugherty in the Court
Taft did have an indirect role in the delay between the arguments and the
Court’s opinion in that he assigned Van Devanter to author the opinion:
“Van Devanter is our strongest man.”460 But then he noted “the trouble
with him is that he insists on writing opinions which involve too great
individual investigation and he is not content therefore to get through an
opinion within a reasonable time, so that now he has carried opinions for
one or two years and he is way behind and this has become a nerve straining
situation.”461 Still, Taft concluded that although McGrain was argued over
two years earlier, it was “a fine opinion.”462
Van Devanter began the Court’s opinion by acknowledging that the
Department of Justice was the nation’s primary agency with the duty of
initiating civil and criminal suits in the name of the United States.463 And
he noted the attorney general supervised the functions of the
department.464 He found it important to highlight that after serious
allegations against Daugherty were brought to the Senate’s attention, the
Senate and House almost unanimously voted to create a committee of five
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to HT (Jan. 17, 1927) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 150 (1927).
464. Id.
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senators to investigate Daugherty’s alleged failure to prosecute frauds
against the government, specifically those frauds allegedly committed by
Fall, Sinclair, Doheny, and Forbes.465 Van Devanter also quickly
dispatched Mally Daugherty’s claim that the delegation of the subpoena to
McGrain was impermissible.466 At the very end of the opinion, Van
Devanter noted that because the Senate, unlike the House, was an ongoing
body and not subject to complete overturn every two years, the issue before
the Court was not mooted simply because there had been an election.467
The main issue before the Court, Van Devanter recognized, was whether
the Senate can compel a private citizen to testify before it, and not whether
either of the two subpoenas were defective or enforceable.468 To this end,
he reached back in time to pre-constitutional history and noted that in
Parliament, as well as in the colonial legislatures, such a power to compel
private citizens existed.469 He also pointed out that early in United States
history, Congress investigated the St. Clair expedition, and James
Madison—then a representative—who was the primary author of the
Constitution voted in favor of the investigation.470 Van Devanter observed
that Congress had also investigated John Brown’s raid of Harper’s Ferry and
ordered Thaddeus Hyatt, a leading abolitionist, to testify even though
senators as powerful as Charles Sumner (R-MA) objected to the power of
that body to do so.471
Just as the district court analyzed Dunn, Kilbourn, Chapman, and Marshall,
so too did Van Devanter. He noted that in Dunn, the House had punished
465. Id. at 150–51 (noting the Senate resolved to investigate failures to civilly prosecute antitrust violations).
466. Id. at 155. The Court determined, that in spite of prior case law, such as Sanborn v. Carleton,
81 Mass. 399 (MA 1860), because the Senate, in 1889, adopted rules permitting the Sergeant at Arms
to appoint deputies to carry out the functions of the Sergeant at Arms, Daugherty’s contention lacked
merit. Id. Likewise, the opinion held that because senators have taken an oath to the Constitution,
Daugherty’s claim that the subpoena violated the Fourteenth Amendment was without merit. Id.
467. Id. at 181–82.
468. Id. at 160.
469. Id. at 161.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 161–62. On the issue of Hyatt, Van Devanter noted:
Sectional and party lines were put aside, and the question was debated and determined with special
regard to principle and precedent. The vote was taken on a resolution pronouncing the witness’
answer insufficient and directing that he be committed until he should signify that he was ready
and willing to testify. The resolution was adopted—44 senators voting for it and 10 against. Cong.
Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1100-1109, 3006-3007.
Id. at 162.
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a citizen with contempt after the citizen attempted to bribe a member of the
House.472 He conceded that the Court in Kilbourn held that although
Congress’s inquiry power is broad, it was impermissible to extend the power
into the personal affairs of private citizens.473 Yet, he also noted Kilbourn
did not prevent the power of congressional inquiry against gaining evidence
in aid of contemplated legislation.474 To Van Devanter, that fact that in In
re Chapman the Court concluded that Congress did not have to announce its
intentions to expel or censure a member of government prior to conducting
an inquiry, meant that an inquiry to protect the integrity of the government
also enabled the exercise of the contempt power.475 Finally, Van Devanter
recognized that the Court in Marshall determined limits to holding private
persons in contempt, such as in matters which did not directly impact
legislative functions.476
Van Devanter ended the opinion with a general discussion of what
occurred in Daugherty’s case as well as the nature of legislative authority.477
The opinion held that the power to investigate was “auxiliary” to the power
to legislate, and both powers had been exercised since the beginning of the
nation.478 In reply to Daugherty’s admonition that the power of inquiry
could become abusive, he answered that, while this might be true, it did not
form a basis for denying the existence of the power.479 Faced with
Cochran’s assertion that Harry Daugherty was a former attorney general and
therefore a private citizen, Van Devanter countered that this was irrelevant
because the Senate’s demand for Mally Daugherty was “to obtain

472. Id. at 168–69.
473. Id. at 170–71.
474. Id. at 171. Van Devanter penned:
The case has been cited at times, and is cited to us now, as strongly intimating, if not holding, that
neither house of Congress has power to make inquiries and exact evidence in aid of contemplated
legislation. There are expressions in the opinion which, separately considered, might bear such an
interpretation; but that this was not intended is shown by the immediately succeeding statement
(page 189) that “This latter proposition is one which we do not propose to decide in the present
case because we are able to decide it without passing upon the existence or non-existence of such
a power in aid of the legislative function.”
Id.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.

Id. at 172.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 175–80.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 175.
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information for legislative purposes.”480 Further, the Senate’s demand for
Mally Daugherty’s testimony was specific to an investigation as to whether
the Department of Justice had comported with its duties to represent the
United States.481 Although, Van Devanter opined, it “would have been
better” had the Senate expressly stated that the investigation was in aid of
legislating, this was unnecessary because of the clear object of the
investigation, namely to determine if the Justice Department had complied
with the law.482 Thus, the Court’s opinion to uphold the Senate’s
investigative power over Mally Daugherty was a blow to Harry Daugherty
and reinforcement that government officers remain amenable to Congress’s
jurisdiction after leaving office. The Court’s opinion also enabled what Taft
wanted to prevent: the uncovering of evidence that would further tarnish
Harry Daugherty as well as Harding’s legacy.
C. The Oil-Lease Fraud Cases: Sinclair, Doheny, Fall . . . and Harding Lose in the
Court
On March 1, the New York Times headlined on its front page that the
Court voided Doheny’s oil leases with the United States government.483
The paper went on to report that while the Elk Hills oil lease and the
construction of oil storage facilities had been obtained by fraud and
corruption, the Justice Department stated that the pending appeal involving
Sinclair and Mammoth Oil involved an even greater degree of corruption
than that of Doheny’s dealings with Fall.484 Other major newspapers
followed suit. The Los Angeles Times reported under the front page banner,
“Doheny Beaten in Battle over Oil Reserve Leases,” that although Doheny
had been acquitted in a criminal trial, the Court “[t]hroughout the decision
referred by way of emphasis to the fraud and corruption marking the
transactions.”485
On February 28, 1927, the Court issued Pan-American Petroleum.486 In an
opinion authored by Justice Butler, the Court accepted McCormick’s factual
480. Id. at 177.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 178.
483. See Doheny Oil Leases Voided for Fraud by High Court; His Loss Over $10,000,000, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 1927, at 1 (demonstrating the urgency of the Doheny oil lease story).
484. Id.
485. Doheny Beaten in Battle over Oil Reserve Leases, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1927, at 1; see also
Albert W. Fox, High Court Cancels Doheny Oil Leases; Corruption Found, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1927, at 1
(reporting the Supreme Court’s finding that Doheny’s leases were obtained by corruption and fraud).
486. Pan-Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 456 (1927).
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and legal conclusions with one significant exception. McCormick had
exempted Denby from the fraud and presented him as a passive participant
in the Elk Hills oil reserve transfer.487 Butler, in contrast, characterized the
oil lease as being “tainted with corruption” and characterized Denby’s
passivity as being a part of the fraud.488 Importantly, Butler agreed with
McCormick that the government did not need to prove that the Navy
suffered a pecuniary loss or any harm at all.489 Rather, the only proof
necessary was that Doheny corruptly obtained Fall’s influence through the
$100,000 loan. “It is clear that, at the instance of Doheny, Fall so favored
the making of these contracts and leases that it was impossible for him
loyally or faithfully to serve the interests of the United States,” Butler
critically noted.490
Butler found as part of fraud that Fall knew well in advance of the bidding
that Doheny’s company would offer to build fuel storage facilities at Pearl
Harbor, while other companies were not informed that this type of offer
would have received more favorable reviews by the government, had there
actually been a normal bidding process.491 Moreover, the Court refused to
exonerate Denby in large measure because he was not called as a witness,
and he had a statutory responsibility to administer the petroleum reserves.
But the Court remained silent as to whether the excuse of national security
required secrecy in granting Doheny access to the California oil fields. And
in sustaining the appellate court’s determination that Doheny was not
entitled to any compensation, Butler noted any redress sought had to be
through the legislative branch.492
On October 10, 1927, the Court, in an opinion also written by Butler,
issued Mammoth Oil 493 and upheld the Eighth Circuit in all but one
substantial matter.494 Butler’s opinion sided with the Ninth Circuit and
determined that regardless of whether a fraud was committed against the

487. See id. at 498 (“We have considered the evidence, and we are satisfied that the findings as
to the matters of fact here controverted are fully sustained, except the statement that Denby signed the
contracts and leases under misapprehension and without full knowledge of the contents of the
documents.”).
488. Id. at 498, 500.
489. Id. at 500.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 494.
492. Id. at 510.
493. Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 13 (1927).
494. Id. at 30.
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government, the June 4, 1920 Act prohibited the lease.495 “A construction
of the act authorizing the agreed disposition of the reserve would conflict
with the policy of the government to maintain in the ground a great reserve
of oil for the [N]avy,” Butler concluded.496 The biggest difference between
Pan-American and Mammoth was that the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit
that the lease violated the statutory law. Still, the opinion did not exonerate
Robison. This was because Butler noted that after July 29, 1921—and
therefore after he negotiated with Sinclair for the lease—Denby replaced
Admiral Griffin as Chief of the Engineering Bureau with Admiral Robison
and replaced a lower ranking officer who had overseen the petroleum
reserves with Robison.497
Taft’s involvement in the oil lease opinion was clearly different, as
evidenced by his letter to his brother Horace shortly before the Court issued
Pan-American Petroleum:
We had one week of a four-week’s session, and begin another week this
morning. I delivered six opinions last week, but don’t expect to deliver any
again until next week. We have two opinions to-day from the Court, one in
the California phase of the Fall and Doheny corrupt conspiracy. Doheny and
Fall were acquitted by the jury, but as you will see they will not be acquitted
by our Court. Doheny may escape imprisonment, but his attempted
manipulation of the Interior Department will cost him a very pretty penny
and it ought to be.498

Whatever Taft may have believed about Harding’s administration in 1924,
by 1927, he at least had determined that Fall and Doheny committed an
egregious crime against the United States. But in conveying his opinion to
his brother, he also exposed that his anger may have played a role in shaping
the Court’s opinion. On the other hand, in a letter written prior to the
issuance of the Mammoth Oil opinion, he informed his son Robert that his
influence over Butler’s opinion was, at best, minimal. “Pierce Butler will
announce our opinion in the Sinclair case tomorrow morning,” Taft
wrote.499 “He has written a very good opinion, though there are one or
495. Id. at 34–35.
496. Id. at 34.
497. Id. at 40.
498. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to HT (Feb. 28, 1927) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
499. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to TT (Oct. 9, 1927) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
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two things I suggested to him that on the whole he thought it wiser not to
put in, and I yielded.”500 Nonetheless, he concluded his letter with the
observation that “[t]he case presents one of the most outrageous instances
of a conspiracy of silence that I know of in the books.”501
Interestingly, Taft was willing to frame Fall’s conduct as an outrageous
corruption, but during the 1920s corruption appeared to occur in his
favored Republican Party in three other instances. In 1921, the Court issued
Newberry v. United States,502 in which the justices overturned a senator’s
conviction under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act.503 Truman Newberry
(R-MI) had been accused of violating Michigan’s campaign finance laws
during the 1918 primary against Henry Ford, and while Newberry prevailed
on his appeal to the Court, there was an effort to remove him from the
Senate following the Court’s opinion.504 On May 27, 1929, a scant thirtyfour days after oral argument, the Court issued Barry v. United States,505 in
which the justices unanimously determined that the Senate had the power
to compel evidence from state officials while investigating alleged election
improprieties of one of its own members.506 Senator William Scott Vare
(R-PA) defeated his opponent William B. Wilson; but after discovering
thousands of suspicious ballots, Governor Gifford Pinchot, also a
Republican, refused to certify the election.507 In early 1927, the Senate
refused to seat Frank L. Smith (R-IL) after it was uncovered that he had
engaged in fraud and payoffs in his election.508

500.
501.
502.
503.
504.

Id.
Id.
Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
Id. at 295.
See, e.g., PAULA BAKER, CURBING CAMPAIGN CASH: HENRY FORD, TRUMAN
NEWBERRY, AND THE POLITICS OF PROGRESSIVE REFORM 3 (2012) (describing how unlawful
campaign spending affected the 1918 Senate election in Michigan).
505. Barry v. United States, 279 U.S. 597 (1929).
506. Id. at 619–620.
507. See, e.g., Samuel J. Astorino, The Contested Senate Election of William Scott Vare, 28 PA. HIST.:
J. MID-ATL. STUD. 187, 192 (1961) (describing the contested race for the Pennsylvania Senate seat in
1926).
508. See Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate
(Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L. J. 35, 59–61 (2005) (explaining
the fallout resulting from Samuel Insull’s illicit contributions to Frank L. Smith’s campaign for the
Illinois Senate seat in 1926).
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V. CONCLUSION
In 1929, Taft persisted to call Van Devanter “the ablest man on the
Court.”509 While Van Devanter had authored a unanimous opinion which
enabled Congress to investigate the executive, the opinion’s issuance had
taken so long that it enabled two election cycles to pass in which the
Republican Party maintained control of the presidency and Congress. This
too, was Taft’s desire. On March 8, 1930, Taft passed away and President
Herbert Hoover appointed Charles Evans Hughes. Taft did not live to see
that an Ohio state court convicted Mally Daugherty of five charges of bank
fraud, including lying about the bank’s funds, declaring bankruptcy with
$300,000 of the bank’s assets, and falsification of bank records.510 He also
did not live long enough to learn that his extrajudicial activities would be
studied for their deleterious effect on the judiciary. In 1970, while the House
investigated the extrajudicial activities of Justice William O. Douglas, it was
pointed out that Taft had advised three Presidents.511 That same year, a
law review note on extra judicial activities pointed out that Taft “was so
close to the . . . Harding administration that many sought patronage from
the national [g]overnment through him.”512 In neither the House
investigation nor the article did it appear that Taft had a unique and
questionable role in the oil-scandal cases.
Because Taft had been president, his example of non-recusal in the face
of ethical questions could appear to be a never-again repeated event. Yet,
questions may very well linger about the Court to this day. After all,
Associate Justice Abe Fortas was rightfully accused of advising
President Lyndon Johnson on foreign and domestic policy matters and,
Justice Douglas also engaged in extrajudicial activities.513 In 1972,
509. Letter from WHT, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to RT (Mar. 17, 1929) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
510. See Mal S. Daugherty Convicted of Bank Fraud; Ohio Jury Finds Him Guilty on First Ballot,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1931, at 1 (reporting on Daugherty’s conviction in Ohio state court); Daugherty
Gets Retrial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1931, at 16 (reporting the Ohio Supreme Court’s refusal to review
the appellate court’s ruling); Mal Daugherty Dies; Defied U.S. Senate, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1948, at B2
(announcing the death of Mally Daugherty).
511. Assoc. Just. William O. Douglas, Final Rep. of the Spec. Subcomm. on H.R 920, 445 (197) (1970)
(statement of Simon Rifkind to Emanuel Celler).
512. Peter Alan Bell, Extrajudicial Activity of Supreme Court Justices, 22 STAN. L. REV. 587, 590–91
(1970).
513. See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE 238–249 (1998) (discussing extrajudicial activities from Supreme Court justices); see generally
JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, THE CAMPAIGN TO IMPEACH JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS: NIXON,
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Justice William Rehnquist took part in Laird v. Tatum, a decision in which
the Court determined that the Army’s domestic surveillance program was
not subject to judicial review, even though as an assistant attorney general
he provided Nixon advice on the legality of the program.514
Most recently, the House and the Manhattan District Attorney
independently subpoenaed President Donald Trump’s tax records, and
although the Court determined that a sitting president was not immune from
a grand jury subpoena, the release of the second opinion—in reality a denial
of review without comment—after the inauguration of Trump’s opponent,
Joseph Biden, rather than before the election, may come under question.515
Perhaps this was the proper timing, but it should not escape notice that one
sitting justice’s spouse was heavily engaged in Trump’s reelection campaign
and contributed to a section of the public’s belief that the election, in spite
of evidence to the contrary, was corrupt.516 The timing rather than the
content of the opinion may have been driven by political considerations.
Taft kept much of his opinions, and perhaps his extrajudicial activities—
such as advising friends subject to the Senate investigation and Coolidge on
the appointment of investigators—hidden from public view. Because there
remains a lack of transparency on the Court, there will also remain the
possibility that a justice—in a case directly involving national security or a
presidential administration—will have past or present ties making recusal
the better course to follow, but not doing so. Greater transparency on past
associations with the government can only be healthy for the judicial branch
and democracy.

VIETNAM, AND THE CONSERVATIVE ATTACK ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 69–110 (2019)
(outlining details of Justice Douglas’s extrajudicial activities regarding foreign policy).
514. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 592–93
(1987) (describing Justice Rehnquist’s participation in Laird v. Tatum).
515. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (argued May 12, 2020, and decided on
July 9, 2020); Trump v. Vance, 977 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2020) (argued September 25, 2020, decided
October 7, 2020). In October 2020, Trump sought an emergency stay from the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit’s decision, and the court denied the stay without comment on February 22, 2021, a
full three and a half months after the election.
516. See John Fritze, Ginni Thomas, Wife of Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, Apologizes for ProTrump Remarks, USA TODAY (Feb. 2, 2021) (reporting Ginni Thomas’s vocal support of Republicans
and former President Donald Trump); Mark Sherman, Justice Thomas’ Wife Boosts Unsupported Claims
Against Biden, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 27, 2020) (describing Ginni Thomas’s political social media
presence).
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